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Abstract
This dissertation presents three studies on the economics of water use and
quality. The first two chapters analyze farmers’ irrigation behavior both
empirically and theoretically. Finally, the third chapter looks at how effective
regulations are in changing firms’ water polluting behavior.
In chapter 1, I analyze how climate variability influences farmers’ irrigation
behavior. The sustainability of irrigated agriculture has come into question
due to the declining fresh water supply and ever-increasing demand for wa-
ter from other sectors due to population growth. Uncertainty brought upon
by ongoing climate change further complicates the situation. An increasing
number of studies now look at the potential impacts of climate change on irri-
gation water use via simulations based on crop and hydrology models. While
irrigation strategy can be specified in their models, it entails limited flexi-
bility, forcing farmers to behave rather mechanically, following a set of rules
pre-specified by the researchers. Econometric approaches, on the other hand,
allow us to elicit the functional relationship between climatic conditions and
irrigation water use in which farmers’ behavioral aspects are embedded im-
plicitly. Previous econometric studies have greatly simplified the relationship
between irrigation water use and climate by simply linking aggregate climate
variables to seasonal irrigation amounts. In this study, we advance the econo-
metric approach by developing an irrigation water use model based on the
agronomy and irrigation science literature. Further, we employ an economet-
ii
ric specification to capture farmers’ potentially nonlinear response to daily
as opposed to annual climate variables. Econometric analysis on well-level
groundwater extraction data in Nebraska shows that farmers indeed respond
nonlinearly to daily climate variables and thus that the use of time-aggregate
climate variables is not desirable. Further, by comparing regression results
on the real data to synthesized data generated by AquaCrop, a crop sim-
ulation model, we find that actual farmers do not respond as strongly to
climate variables as would a hypothetical farmer programmed to follow a soil
moisture target strategy. This indicates that previous predictions of changes
in irrigation water use due to climate change may have been overstated.
In chapter 2, I examine the implications of energy supply interruption on
groundwater consumption for irrigation. In groundwater-irrigated agricul-
ture, energy and water uses are inextricably linked as energy is required to
pump water from the aquifer. The direct link between these resources implies
that a policy change on one side influences the other side as well. Energy sup-
pliers commonly use a irrigation load control program in which energy supply
may be cut off in order to manage peak energy load. Under energy supply
interruption, farmers need to take into account the possibility of random in-
put supply interruption when deciding the timing and amount of irrigation.
I develop and solve a stochastic dynamic optimization problem of irrigation
schedule under random input supply interruption, in order to understand how
farmers adapt their irrigation strategy and the consequent effects on seasonal
groundwater consumption. I find that farmers will increase the amount of ir-
rigation per irrigation opportunity to hedge against the risk of not being able
to irrigate in future periods. The impact of energy supply interruption on
seasonal groundwater consumption, however, cannot be signed analytically
and is an empirical question. Numerical examples with a model calibrated
iii
to corn production in Nebraska show that the total amount of irrigation may
indeed go up as a consequence of a load control program in the region. This
indicates that a policy that is effective for energy demand management could
provide agricultural producers with a perverse incentive in terms of ground-
water consumption. As a result, joint energy-water management planning in
groundwater-irrigated agriculture can be beneficial.
Finally, in chapter 3, I examine the deterrence effects of regulatory ac-
tivities on point-source pollution discharges into bodies of water under the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program estab-
lished as part of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The contribution of this study
lies in advancements in econometric strategy that allow a particularly difficult
endogeneity problem to finally be addressed. Estimating the true impacts of
regulatory activities on polluters’ environmental performance is inherently
difficult due to a reverse causality: firms that emit more attract more regu-
latory actions. The fixed effects estimation method has been commonly used
as it avoids this reverse causality by limiting identification information to
variation over time, discarding cross-sectional variation. We show that the
strict exogeneity assumption, necessary for the consistency of fixed effects es-
timators, can be violated due to the dynamic interactions between regulators
and polluters. I employ a generalized method moment estimation using mo-
ment conditions based on sequential exogeneity assumptions that are weaker
than strict exogeneity. The fixed effects estimation results indicate that non-
monetary sanctions would increase the amount of Total Suspended Solids
(TSS) discharged and that fines have no impact on reducing TSS discharges.
On the contrary, GMM results indicate that non-monetary sanctions have
no impact but fines have significant deterrence effects.
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CHAPTER 1
AN ECONOMETRIC APPROACH TO
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON
IRRIGATION WATER USE FOR
AGRICULTURE
1.1 Introduction
Irrigation has contributed enormously to society by making agricultural pro-
duction possible and more productive in arid regions, providing a buffer
against climate variability (Schlenker et al., 2007; Schlenker and Roberts,
2009). These benefits, however, come at the cost of great pressures on fresh
water resources as irrigated agriculture comprises about 70% of total con-
sumptive water use worldwide. Declining fresh water availability and ever-
increasing competition for water have raised concern over the sustainability
of irrigated agriculture and thus long-term food security (Scott and Shah,
2004; Llamas and Mart´ınez-Santos, 2005; Scott, 2011; Gleeson et al., 2012).
Ongoing climate change further complicates the situation by adding uncer-
tainty to fresh water availability and demand (Ferguson and Gleeson, 2012;
Taylor et al., 2013). Given its significance in global consumptive water use
and direct link to climate, it is important to understand the effects of cli-
mate change on irrigation water use in order to understand future fresh water
availability for irrigated agriculture and other sectors. This study aims at
understanding farmers’ irrigation behavior and examining how climate vari-
ability influences irrigation water use.
We have extensive knowledge of how climate variability influences the
amount of water required to achieve certain levels of crop yield thanks to
numerous field experiments in the agronomy and irrigation science litera-
ture. However, we know surprisingly little about the relationship between
climate variability and actual irrigation water use by farmers (not by re-
searchers who conduct field experiments), due primarily to the lack of accu-
rate statistics available on irrigation water use for agriculture. In most cases,
irrigation water use statistics, if any, are available only at an aggregate level
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(by municipality, county, or country) and of sometimes questionable qual-
ity. Regression analyses using observed irrigation use data implicitly embed
farmers’ irrigation decisions in their estimates. Previous regression analyses,
however, focused mainly on the impacts of economic factors, paying insuffi-
cient attention to climate factors.
With its significance in global consumptive water use and its direct link
to climate, irrigation water use plays a central role in assessing the inter-
connection between climate change, irrigation, the hydrological cycle, and
food supply (Haddeland et al., 2013). Recently, there has been an increasing
number of studies of the link between some or all of the components of this
interconnection via simulation analysis (e.g., Do¨ll, 2002; Alcamo et al., 2003;
Fischer et al., 2007; Rost et al., 2008; Shahid, 2011; Zhang and Cai, 2013;
Elliott et al., 2013; Gerten et al., 2013; Mehta et al., 2013; Konzmann et al.,
2013; Wada et al., 2013). In these studies, farmers are modeled either as
satisfying the irrigation requirement, defined as the amount of water needed
to maximize crop yield, or as following a simple irrigation trigger strategy,
where irrigation is triggered once soil moisture content hits a certain level.
However, it has not been empirically verified that farmers actually follow
either of these rules. Indeed, as Fischer et al. (2007) pointed out themselves,
an irrigation requirement is highly likely to overestimate actual irrigation
water use (Wriedt et al., 2009). While irrigation water use estimated by an
irrigation trigger strategy is more realistic, it is rather mechanical and also
assumes perfect information about the state of soil moisture. Therefore, it
is possible that farmers’ actual irrigation behavior differs from what is pre-
dicted in the simulation models. As irrigation water use is the core of these
simulation models, it is valuable to assess the validity of the trigger strategy.
The main objectives of the study are three-fold: 1) to advance an econo-
metric model of irrigation water use that incorporates biophysical aspects of
crop water use and potential nonlinear responses to climate variability, 2) to
understand the impacts of changes in climatic conditions on actual irrigation
water use via regression analysis of observed micro-level irrigation water use
data, and 3) to check the validity of an irrigation trigger strategy.
In our regression analysis, we examine throughout one growing season
how seasonal irrigation water use is influenced by daily precipitation and
crop evapotranspiration, the major weather-related determinants of irriga-
tion identified in the agronomy and irrigation engineering literature. We
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follow with our econometric approach Schlenker and Roberts (2009) (hence-
forth, SR), which allows us to examine how seasonal irrigation water use is
influenced by changes in the distribution of daily climatic conditions, includ-
ing historical climate extremes. This is particularly important in assessing
the impacts of climate change because historical extremes are expected to be
more common in the future under ongoing climate change. Climate change
impact assessment is prone to errors when we use the estimated response of
irrigation to time-aggregated climate variables such as annual temperature.
Our approach further allows us to take into account the time-varying water
needs of crops depending on their growth stage: water is more critical in
some periods of an irrigation season than others. We use the agronomy and
irrigation engineering literature to incorporate the growth-dependent and
time-varying nature of water needs by crop into our regression analysis.
In order to assess how closely a trigger irrigation strategy mimics actual
irrigation behavior by farmers in Nebraska, we compare regression results on
observed data and synthesized data. First, daily climate data are synthesized
by running LARS-WG, a daily weather generator1. We then run AquaCrop
to simulate irrigation water use by a hypothetical farmer programmed to fol-
low trigger strategies2. Finally, we compare the regression results on observed
and synthesized data.
We found that a hypothetical farmer following trigger strategies responds
much more strongly to changes in climate conditions than actual farmers
in Nebraska do. This implies that the simulation models used in previous
studies may overstate climate change impacts on irrigation water use, making
irrigated agriculture too influential in the whole system. We also found that
farmers respond nonlinearly to climate variability, responding strongly to
crop water needs at the extreme. This indicates that prediction based on a
linear model is likely to produce biased estimates of climate change impacts
on irrigation water use.
It is important to keep in mind that our focus is placed on irrigation water
use on the intensive margin (water use conditional on crop type and irri-
gated acres). It is of course necessary to look at other aspects of irrigated
1LARS-WG first analyzes historical climate and then generates climate variables that
are consistent with the historical trend (Semenov and Stratonovitch, 2010).
2AquaCrop is a crop simulation model developed by the FAO that is well suited to
model the relationship between water and crop yield (Steduto et al., 2009; Raes et al.,
2009)
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agriculture in order to understand fully how climate change influences irriga-
tion water use. For example, crop and cultivar switching and changing the
acres irrigated are important potential adaptation strategies which have sig-
nificant impacts on irrigation water use. These aspects, however, are outside
the scope of the study.
We begin by reviewing the literature and describing the significance and
contributions of our study. We then review briefly the relationship between
climate, soil moisture, and irrigation. In section 3, some background on the
study area and data is described, followed by detailed descriptions of the
econometric strategy and regression results in sections 4 and 5, respectively.
Section 6 shows the simulation results of climate change impacts on water
consumption for irrigation. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review and Significance of the Study
There is growing interest in understanding the potential impacts of climate
change on irrigation water requirement or use (e.g., Do¨ll, 2002; Alcamo et
al., 2003; Fischer et al., 2007; Rodr´ıguez Dı´az et al., 2007; Thomas, 2008;
Siebert and Do¨ll, 2010; Shahid, 2011; Chung et al., 2011; Gondim et al.,
2012; Schaldach et al., 2012; Zhang and Cai, 2013; Konzmann et al., 2013;
Wada et al., 2013). Some studies look at the interconnection between irri-
gated agriculture, hydrological cycles, and food production within a single
integrated framework in which irrigation water use plays a key role (e.g.,
Mehta et al., 2013; Elliott et al., 2013). Elliott et al. (2013), in particular,
compared six state-of-the-art global gridded crop models (GGCMs) and 10
global hydrological models (GHM) in terms of irrigation water use and fresh
water availability under various climate change scenarios among others.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that these models are not de-
signed to predict the amount of irrigation by farmers. There is an important
distinction between predicting crop yields or changes in hydrological cycles
and irrigation water use. For example, crop yield predictions are purely bio-
physical once irrigation strategy is modeled. On the other hand, irrigation
management involves farmers’ judgments on when and how much to irri-
gate. Some of the existing models, such as LPJmL, EPIC, and pDSSAT,
incorporate irrigation management to some extent. For example, LPJmL
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controls irrigation management by four parameters: the depth of soil mois-
ture; the lower and upper soil moisture levels that trigger and stop irrigation,
respectively; and the irrigation application efficiency (e.g., Bondeau et al.,
2007; Rost et al., 2008; Konzmann et al., 2013; Biemans et al., 2013; Gerten
et al., 2013). EPIC uses similar parameters: crop water stress to trigger
irrigation, irrigation efficiency, minimal interval of irrigation, and the mini-
mum and maximum irrigation volume (e.g., Bulatewicz et al., 2009; Mehta
et al., 2013). These rather mechanical irrigation practices, however, may not
accurately reflect those of actual farmers. Guerra et al. (2005) compared
irrigation water use simulated with EPIC to actual irrigation water use by
farmers in Georgia. They found that EPIC predicted actual irrigation water
use reasonably well for 2001. However, the model severely underestimated
actual irrigation water use for 2000 and 2002, most likely because of the large
amount of irrigation in response to lack of precipitation in the middle of the
irrigation season (Guerra et al., 2005). Indeed, the farmers applied about
60% more water than the crop would have needed. This type of irrigation
behavior cannot be captured in the existing simulation models: unlike the
hypothetical farmer in the simulation models, actual farmers are less likely
to have complete information about soil moisture conditions.
In most of the simulation studies, the soil moisture threshold is set rather
arbitrarily even though the amount of irrigation depends crucially on irri-
gation practices, as clearly shown in Wriedt et al. (2009). Since irrigation
water use is the core of the simulation model, errors in irrigation decision
modeling can have a large impact on the simulated outcomes. In order to
relate climate variability to actual water use by farmers, it is essential to
have observed water use data. Unfortunately, they are rarely measured, with
few exceptions, and the lack of observed data has been an obstacle to con-
necting climate conditions to water demand. The lack of data explains the
difficulty in calibrating the model to conform to actual water use. A rare ex-
ception is the self-reported parcel-level groundwater use database managed
by the Kansas Department of Water Resources (DWR)3. Bulatewicz et al.
(2009) used this data set to calibrate EPIC, including the parameters related
to irrigation strategy listed above. Their estimate of a minimal interval of
3Self-reporting raises concerns over data quality as there is no incentive for farmers to
report accurate numbers and no ramifications for inaccurate measurements. No quality
assurance has yet been performed on this data.
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irrigation of 10.3 days is longer than that practiced by Kansas farmers. Cali-
brating EPIC to actual water use forces the hypothetical farmer to behave in
a particular manner – trigger strategy – that may not match actual irrigation
practice. As a consequence, errors may spread to other parts of the model,
such as crop development. Indeed, crop water productivity coefficients are
much higher than the values estimated by field experiments. Therefore, it
seems worthwhile to find a more flexible way to model irrigation water use.
In this study, we take an econometric approach, which allows us to elicit
the functional relationship between climatic conditions and irrigation water
use, in which farmers’ behavioral aspects are embedded implicitly. Our study
is not the first regression analysis on observed irrigation water use. Previous
econometric studies of irrigation water demand, however, have focused on es-
timating the price elasticity of irrigation (e.g., Nieswiadomy, 1985; Ogg and
Gollehon, 1989; Frasier and Pfeiffer, 1994; Schoengold et al., 2006; Hendricks
and Peterson, 2012; Pfeiffer and Lin, forthcoming). These econometric mod-
els are not designed to provide a deeper understanding of the relationship
between climate and irrigation water use; they simply include as covariates
time-aggregate raw climate variables such as temperature, precipitation and
evapotranspiration. We advance the literature of econometric irrigation anal-
ysis by incorporating detailed biophysical processes of crop growth that are
associated with its water requirements within an irrigation season. Specif-
ically, we run a calibrated AquaCrop model developed recently in Steduto
et al. (2009) that calculates evapotranspiration of the crop on a daily ba-
sis, taking into account root development and canopy growth among others
(the AquaCrop model will be discussed in more detail later.). Our econo-
metric approach mixes in an advantage of simulation-based approaches by
incorporating the dynamics of crop water needs that depend on crop growth
stage. This is in contrast to previous studies that use reference evapotranspi-
ration (rET) as a covariate, which does not take into account growth-stage-
dependent crop water needs.
In predicting climate change impacts on irrigation water use, it is impor-
tant to capture the impacts of current climate extremes because they will
become more common in the future and carry more weight in determining
irrigation water use. Recently, Schlenker and Roberts (2009), using a novel
econometric specification, captured the nonlinear impacts of hourly temper-
ature on rain-fed corn production in the U.S., without observing hourly corn
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growth, during a production season. They show that corn yield is particu-
larly vulnerable to extremely high temperatures. This differential impact of
temperature would have been missed completely using a seasonal mean tem-
perature as a covariate and the conclusion would have been that an increase
in temperature helps crop growth. Thus, using seasonal mean climatic vari-
ables as a covariate can lead to a misleading conclusion about the impact of
climate change on crop production. As in SR , accurate measurement of the
impacts of current climate extremes, such as very high evapotranspiration,
is important in our study. This study, unlike previous econometric analyses,
applies SR’s approach instead of using time-aggregate climate variables as
covariates.
We also make a methodological contribution by refining an econometric
strategy proposed in Schlenker and Roberts (2009). Using the method of
sieves, we show that discretization of the distribution of variables imple-
mented in Schlenker and Roberts (2009) is not necessary, which results in a
gain in estimation efficiency. Finally, we use highly reliable well-level ground-
water consumption data collected in southwest Nebraska over the past 30
years.
1.3 Primer on Irrigation
In this study, it is vital to clearly distinguish the relevant variables, whose
definitions can blur across scientific fields such as agronomy, irrigation engi-
neering, hydrology, and economics. Here we will review some basics of the
interrelationship between climate, soil moisture, and irrigation, explaining
the differences in various important concepts and definitions along the way.
Plants take in water only through their roots. Therefore, understanding
the relationship between water and crop growth means understanding the re-
lationship between soil moisture (water in the soil available for use by crops)
and crop growth. The purpose of irrigation is to supplement the soil with
water when water supply from precipitation is not as abundant as desired.
Unlike precipitation, which directly affects soil moisture, climate conditions
such as temperature, wind speed, radiation, and humidity affect the soil
moisture more subtly by altering the dynamics of water transfer among the
atmosphere, soil, and crop. The agronomy and irrigation engineering litera-
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ture has developed the concept of evapotranspiration (henceforth ET) - the
amount of water lost from the soil due to evaporation from the soil and tran-
spiration from the crop. ET encompasses relevant climatic conditions such
as temperature, wind speed, radiation, and humidity and is universally used
in many scientific fields as an indicator of the degree to which atmospheric
forces induce evaporation and transpiration. This study uses precipitation
and ET as climate variables to explain groundwater use for irrigation. Below,
we discuss how precipitation and ET can influence irrigation water use; we
then make clear distinctions among several types of ET.
1.3.1 Precipitation
Precipitation supplies water to the soil and reduces the need for irrigation.
Not all precipitation, however, will be used by the crop due to surface runoff,
evaporation, and deep percolation. For instance, 1 inch of rainfall does not re-
sult in a reduction in groundwater use by 1 inch. Effective rainfall (Peff ), the
portion of rainfall used by a crop, depends on the soil type and soil moisture
available, among other factors (Martin and Gilley, 1993). Since irrigation
alters the soil moisture condition, effective rainfall is irrigation management-
dependent (Martin and Gilley, 1993). Suppose a farmer irrigates to field
capacity4 right before precipitation. In this case, the infiltration rate of rain-
fall is low and more precipitation will be lost due to surface runoff. On the
other hand, if irrigation is stopped to leave enough room for water in the
soil, the infiltration rate is higher and more water seeps into the soil. In
our study, precipitation is embedded in irrigation water use data and thus in
our estimates of the impacts of precipitation on irrigation water use as well.
Note that our estimates cannot be defined exactly as effective precipitation
because there is no guarantee that farmers will reduce the amount of irriga-
tion exactly by the amount of effective precipitation. They are expected to
approach this amount, however.
4The maximum amount of water the soil can hold.
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1.3.2 Evapotranspiration
There are several types of ET, so it is crucial to distinguish them clearly for
this study. Reference ET (rET ) refers to evapotranspiration from the refer-
ence surface, defined as “hypothetical grass reference crop with an assumed
crop height of 0.12 m, a fixed surface resistance of 70 sm−1 and an albedo
of 0.23,” according to Allen et al. (1998)5. This measure is affected only
by climate factors and is independent of the type of crop grown, soil type,
and irrigation management. Therefore, reference ET provides a universal
measure of atmospheric forces, inducing evapotranspiration, and acts as a
benchmark. Though not specified, reference ET is likely the type of ET used
in previous empirical analyses of irrigation water use (e.g., Hendricks and
Peterson, 2012; Pfeiffer and Lin, forthcoming). When evapotranspiration
is adjusted according to the specific characteristics of the crop grown and
its growth stage, it is called crop ET. Specifically, crop ET at the standard
condition (henceforth, cET ) refers to the amount of water loss from the soil
due to evaporation and transpiration when the crop is under ideal growing
conditions without disease or water stress (Allen et al., 1998). This measure
is purely biophysical by definition, is independent of irrigation management,
and is the type of ET used in previous analyses of climate change impacts on
irrigation needs (e.g., Do¨ll, 2002; Fischer et al., 2007; Rodr´ıguez Dı´az et al.,
2007; Thomas, 2008; Shahid, 2011; Chung et al., 2011; Gondim et al., 2012;
Schaldach et al., 2012; Zhang and Cai, 2013). Actual crop ET on the field
is distinct and can be substantially different from cET because the soil is
not always fully watered in practice (Droogers, 2000; Wriedt et al., 2009).
Actual ET cannot be observed for our study, nor should it be used as an ex-
planatory variable, since our objective is to estimate the farmer’s response to
exogenous ET but not to management-dependent (endogenous) ET. For this
reason, we only consider rET and cET as potential explanatory variables
instead of actual ET. Hereafter, crop ET refers to crop ET at the standard
condition.
Crop ET varies significantly within an irrigation season depending on its
growth stage. Figure 1.1 shows an example of daily corn evapotranspiration
and its breakdown into soil evaporation and crop transpiration during the
5Before the concept of reference ET was developed, potential evapotranspiration was
commonly used
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irrigation season. Initially, the biomass of a crop is small and the soil is almost
fully exposed because the shade provided by the crop is minuscule. Therefore,
crop ET is almost identical to evaporation, as can be seen in Figure 1.1. As
the crop grows, transpiration becomes greater and evaporation becomes less
as more soil surface is shaded. For example, at the stage when corn tassel
emerges, the soil surface is almost fully shaded and corn ET is equivalent to
transpiration from the corn, as can be seen in the second half of Figure 1.1.
Once senescence is triggered, transpiration declines and soil evaporation rises
at the same time as the canopy cover dwindles. When corn reaches maturity,
irrigation ceases to have any impact on corn yield and water needs become
zero. We will explicitly take into account the intra-seasonally varying crop
ET, which has not been done in previous statistical analyses on irrigation
water use.
1.4 Study Area and Data
The geographical focus of this study includes three counties located in the
southwest corner of Nebraska: Chase, Dundy, and Perkins Counties (see Fig-
ure 1.2). The state of Nebraska has the largest number of irrigated acres
in the United States, surpassing California, and is a major corn production
state. Western Nebraska is much drier than eastern Nebraska and ground-
water is the only source of irrigation, unlike some of the eastern counties,
where surface and groundwater are used jointly. Nebraska, after a series of
lawsuits by Kansas, is currently under a legal obligation to limit the amount
of groundwater extraction (Palazzo, 2009). Managing groundwater use for
irrigated agriculture is thus of paramount importance to both farmers and
water managers there6.
Concerned with the sustainability of irrigated agriculture in the region,
the Upper Republican Natural Resource District (URNRD), whose jurisdic-
tion covers the three counties listed above, started measuring groundwater
extraction at the well level in 1981. The dependent variable of this study is
the well-level groundwater extraction data of about 2800 wells in the region,
observed over the past 30 years. In this study, we restrict our attention to
6A more detailed description on the history of groundwater use for agriculture and legal
conflicts with surrounding states can be found in Palazzo (2009)
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groundwater extraction by farmers who grow corn exclusively, given that it
is by far the dominant crop grown in the region. Mixing groundwater extrac-
tion for corn and other crops in one regression model is not desirable as the
water requirement varies by crop type. Since farmers produce crops other
than corn in some years, our longitudinal data set is unbalanced.
In order to calculate corn ET accurately using AquaCrop, daily observa-
tions on maximum and minimum temperature, precipitation, wind speed,
radiation, and humidity are desirable7. We use the weather station located
at Champion, Nebraska, which makes available accurate measures of all the
necessary daily climate variables for 1982-2012 (see Figure 1.2). Its potential
drawback is that assigning values of climate variables to wells located far
from the station may introduce significant measurement errors. There are
several daily climate data sets available that cover the entire region, includ-
ing PRISM and the National Land Data Assimilation Systems (NLDAS).
Unfortunately, PRISM does not provide data on wind speed, radiation, or
humidity. While NLDAS provides all the necessary climate variables on a
daily basis, comparison of weather data from the station and the correspond-
ing grid from NLDAS show that the wind speed recorded by NLDAS is sub-
stantially lower than that actually observed by the station, thus leading to
downward bias on corn ET. Another possibility would be to spatially inter-
polate climate variables observed at other stations located nearby. Thus, one
way or another, measurement errors would be unavoidable if we attempted
to use all the observations in the region. We therefore choose to use weather
data from the Champion weather station, but restrict our attention to wells
located within a circle of 11.13 km (0.1 decimal degree) radius centering
around the weather station, represented by the blue circle in Figure 1.3.
Indeed, we find that attenuation bias becomes greater as more distant obser-
vations are included in the regression8. Our strategy is to use accurate data
on geographically restricted samples for the sake of minimizing attenuation
bias at the expense of estimation efficiency.
7More precisely, the variables listed above are desirable for calculating reference ET
accurately; they are then used as inputs for AquaCrop
8For example, regression using the full sample leads to about 60% downward bias from
those using the geographically restricted samples.
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1.4.1 Corn Evapotranspiration Calculation with AquaCrop
AquaCrop, an improved version of CropWat, was developed by the FAO in
order to model crop yield when water is the limiting factor in crop production
Steduto et al. (2009). It models jointly the dynamic relationships between
crop development, soil water balance, and atmospheric status with a partic-
ular focus on the transfers of water within the system on a daily basis. Here
we briefly review details relevant to our study, referring interested readers
to Steduto et al. (2009) and Raes et al. (2009) for fuller descriptions of the
model.
AquaCrop simulates soil evaporation (E) and crop transpiration (Tr) sep-
arately, unlike CropWat, because modeling crop development based on evap-
otranspiration will confound soil evaporation (non-beneficial) and crop tran-
spiration (beneficial). Under no water stress, transpiration at day t is mod-
eled as follows:
Trt = CC
∗
t ·Kcbx · rETt (1.1)
where CC∗ is the microadvection-adjusted canopy cover and Kcbx is the crop
coefficient when the full canopy cover is reached9. Kcbx is crop-specific and
typically obtained through field experiments. As can be seen in the above
equation, crop transpiration grows with the canopy cover. Note that climate
conditions affect daily transpiration primarily through rET .
In AquaCrop, the soil is compartmentalized vertically into multiple layers.
Water exchanges between the top soil layer and atmosphere and between the
soil layers due to capillary rise and percolation are modeled. As opposed to
crop transpiration, soil evaporation decreases as the canopy cover increases,
reflecting more shaded area on the soil surface.
Canopy cover is the common variable that governs both crop transpiration
and soil evaporation in AquaCrop. Growth and senescence of canopy cover
through an irrigation season is determined by Growing Degree Days (GDD).
We ran a calibrated AquaCrop model using observed raw climate data from
each year from 1982 to 2012, calculating and tracking daily soil evaporation
and crop transpiration, among other factors. The planting date for each
year is obtained from the crop progress reports of the National Agricultural
9Crop coefficient is a constant that indicates how strong the crop ET is compared to
the reference ET
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Statistics Service (NASS), published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA). Since they report only the percentage of farmers who have planted
at the time of the crop progress surveys, the date when the percentage hits
50% was chosen as the planting date for that year. The end date for irrigation
each year was set at the date when maturity is reached because irrigation
will no longer influence corn yield after its maturity.
1.4.2 Synthesized Data
In order to compare irrigation behavior estimated using the observed data
and soil moisture target irrigation strategy programmed in AquaCrop, we
take the following steps:
1. Run LARS-WG to synthesize daily climate variables for 1000 sample
years;
2. Run AquaCrop to calculate corn ET based on the outputs of the pre-
vious step each year;
3. Run AquaCrop to calculate seasonal irrigation water use for varying
levels of soil moisture targets: 45%-75% with steps of 5%.
LARS-WG first analyzes the historical joint distribution of daily climate
variables and then synthesizes daily climate data that are consistent with
the pattern observed in the input data. Since LARS-WG does not simulate
wind speed, daily wind speed is assumed to be its historical mean in the
region. All the other factors that may influence irrigation amounts, such
as soil type, are held fixed as there is no point in introducing additional
variability in irrigation amounts.
1.5 Econometric Strategy
In this section, the econometric model is first constructed and discussed
with particular focus on how time-varying water needs of corn are incor-
porated. Our choice of crop ET over reference ET will be discussed and
justified. Then we review the econometric method developed in Schlenker
and Roberts (2009), propose an alternative econometric specification using
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a linear sieve, and discuss its potential advantages. Third, the shape restric-
tions of estimated functions that are consistent with irrigation theory will be
introduced. Finally, we discuss a spatial-individual double block bootstrap
to obtain robust estimates of the standard error of the estimator.
1.5.1 Modeling the Impacts of Climate Variability
Incorporating Biophysics
Denote the amount of precipitation for farmer i at day t in year y as Ri,t,y.
Further, let Ri,y denote the series of precipitation events during the irrigation
season for individual i in year y: that is, Ri,y = {Ri,1,y, Ri,2,y, . . . , Ri,Ty ,y},
where Ty is the end period of irrigation season for year y. Analogously,
define rETi,y = {rETi,1,y, rETi,2,y, . . . , rETi,Ty ,y} as the series of reference
ET for farmer i at day t in year y. With these notations, a conceptual model
of irrigation water use may be expressed as:
Wi,y = γ + f(Ri,y) + h(rETi,y) +Xi,yδ + µi + εi,y (1.2)
where Wi,y is farmer i’s water use in year y, γ is the intercept, Xi,y contains
all the other covariates that may influence irrigation amount, µi is individual
fixed effects, and εi,y is an idiosyncratic error.
Functions f(·), h(·) : RTy → R1 in (1.2) are fully general in the sense
that the values of precipitation and reference ET on different days are dis-
tinguished. This specification thus takes fully into account the fact that the
water needs of the crop vary within an irrigation season depending on crop
growth stage. However, f(·) and h(·) cannot be estimated reliably because
of the curse of dimensionality inherent in the estimation of high-dimensional
functions. Given that annual groundwater use is by definition the summa-
tion of daily water use, the dimensionality of the functions may be reduced
as follows:
Wi,y = γ +
Ty∑
t=1
fd(Ri,t,y) +
Ty∑
t=1
hd(rETi,t,y) +Xi,yδ + µi + εi,y (1.3)
where fd(·) and hd(·) are the functions that map daily precipitation and
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reference ET onto their impacts on seasonal water use, respectively. The
drawback of this model is that it does not take into account growth-stage
dependent water needs of the crop: function hd(·) stays the same throughout
the irrigation season. One way to alleviate this problem is to have different
functions for different crop growth stages as Ortiz-Bobea (2013) did in the
context of climate change impacts on corn yields. With J growth stages of
corn, the above model can be specified as:
Wi,y = γ +
Ty∑
t=1
fd(Ri,t,y) +
J∑
j=1
Tj,y∑
t=1
mj(rETi,j,t,y) +Xi,yδ + µi + εi,y (1.4)
where Tj,y is the end period of growth stage j in year y and mj(·) is the
function that maps a reference ET in growth stage j onto irrigation water
use in year y. This model describes the relationship between climate and
irrigation more accurately than (1.3). The more clearly distinguished the
growth stages, the more accurate the model is, but with an increasing number
of functions to estimate.
In this study, we adjust the definition of a covariate instead of adjusting
functions to be estimated, which avoids the drawbacks associated with (1.4).
This can be done by using crop ET instead of reference ET as a covariate.
It is important to remember that time-varying water use intensity of the
crop is embedded in the values of crop ET. Therefore, with a single function
gd(·) that maps crop ET onto its impact on seasonal irrigation water use, the
model can be specified as:
Wi,y = γ +
Ty∑
t=1
fd(Ri,t,y) +
Ty∑
t=1
gd(cETi,t,y) +Xi,yδ + µi + εi,y (1.5)
where cETi,t,y is the corn ET of farm i at day t in year y. This model is
more parsimonious than model (1.4) because there are only two functions to
estimate. However, it takes fully into account the growth-stage dependent
water needs of crops, while model (1.4) does so only partially. Moreover,
note that gd(·) is crop-independent as well as time-independent. Function
gd(·) maps crop ET, not just for corn, onto its impact on seasonal irrigation
water use. On the other hand, mj(·) is a crop-dependent function because
its argument, reference ET, is a crop-independent statistic of evapotranspi-
rative force. Therefore, any estimates of mj(·) would be corn-specific and
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not applicable to other crops that possess different characteristics and water
use intensity. Unlike hˆd(·) or mˆj(·), gˆd(·) can be used to estimate irrigation
water use for any crops under various climatic conditions once their crop ET
are calculated. Thus, our estimation results hold a certain level of external
validity to other crops, if not completely.
Econometric Specification of the Nonlinear Functions
SR first define the bin width of a histogram of hourly temperature for a given
year and then find the frequency of each bin. Denoting the cumulative dis-
tribution of daily temperature by Φ(·), their specification of the contribution
of hourly temperature with a bin width of 1 Celsius degree is as follows:
40∑
h=0
g(h+ 0.5)[Φ(h+ 1)− Φ(h)] (1.6)
where g(·) represents the impact of a unit increase in the frequency of tem-
perature that falls within h and h+1 relative to that under 0 degrees Celsius
10. When g(·) is assumed to be constant for each bin, the resulting estimated
function will be a step function. Another option for specifying g(·) is to use
a spline basis function as in g(x) =
K∑
j=i
λj · δj(x), where δj(·) are spline basis
functions. In this specification, δj(·) are always evaluated at pre-specified
points, (0.5, 1.5, . . . , 39.5), independent of the distribution of hourly temper-
ature. By changing the size of bin width, the evaluation points of the basis
functions becomes scarcer or denser.
It is, however, possible to forgo the need of selecting bin width without
going outside the linear-in-parameter regression framework; that function
estimation can be more efficient because the evaluation points of bases are
much denser. Denote θ(x) =
J∑
j=1
αj · φj(x) a linear sieve, where αj ∈ R, ∀j
10Since the summation of frequencies is always 1, including all the frequency variables
will result in perfect collinearity. In SR, the frequency of Celsius degree under 0 is dropped
and used as the base.
16
and φj(x) is a basis function. Then fd(Ri,t,y) may be written as follows:
fd(Ri,t,y) =
J∑
j=1
αj · φj(Ri,t,y) (1.7)
This representation of fd(·) is linear in parameter, by construction of a linear
sieve. Once α is determined, fd(·) can be recovered. Then,
Ty∑
t=1
fd(Ri,t,y) =
Ty∑
t=1
Jf∑
j=1
αjφj(Ri,t,y)
=
Jf∑
j=1
αj
( T∑
t=1
φj(Ri,t,y)
)
(1.8)
Note that we are still in the realm of a linear-in-parameter regression frame-
work due to the linearity and additivity of a sieve representation of the func-
tion. Furthermore, basis functions are evaluated at as many points as the
number of unique values of Ri,t,y, in contrast to SR’s specification, which
introduces some approximation errors. As a consequence, our specification is
more efficient than that of SR (see Appendix A.4 for a simple Monte Carlo
simulation). Hereafter, our econometric specification is denoted as MBF, for
the sake of conciseness. Analogous with fd(·), gd(·) may be expressed as:
T∑
t=1
gd(cETi,t,y) =
Jg∑
j=1
βj
( T∑
t=1
ψj(cETi,t,y)
)
(1.9)
where ψj(·) are basis functions and βj are their coefficients. The econometric
model can be expressed as
Wi,y = γ +
Jf∑
j=1
αj
( Ty∑
t=1
φj(Ri,t,y)
)
+
Jg∑
j=1
βj
( Ty∑
t=1
ψj(cETi,t,y)
)
+Xi,yδ + µi + εi,y
(1.10)
There are many alternative bases for a linear sieve, including power series,
splines, and Fourier series. We use a Bernstein basis polynomial for this
study due to its attractive properties in restricting the shape of estimated
functions (Wang and Ghosh, 2012)11.
11See Appendix A.1 for more on the Bernstein polynomial and its use in regression.
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1.5.2 Other Controls and Potential Endogeneity
Individual fixed effects are included in the model. Therefore, time-invariant
covariates are controlled for and no bias due to omitting those variables is
incurred. For example, soil characteristics are one of the key variables in
determining the need for irrigation because they determine the degree of
water loss from the soil due to deep percolation and surface runoff. Soil
characteristics, however, stay essentially the same over time.12.
If the region has experienced a significant shift in the pattern of climatic
conditions within the observed period, such as warming, farmers may have
developed the ability to adapt their irrigation strategy accordingly. In this
case, a time-varying component of the unobserved ability can be correlated
with climatic conditions over time, causing endogeneity. This, however, is
unlikely to be the case. There is no clear indication that Nebraska has
experienced significant changes or shifts in climatic conditions due to ongoing
climate change, as can be seen in Figure 1.5.
The amount of irrigation is also influenced by economic factors, such as the
price of corn and pumping costs, as well as environmental factors. Unfortu-
nately, no data on the cost of pumping is available for the region. However, it
has been empirically shown that farmers are highly insensitive to changes in
pumping costs on the intensive margin, while they are more sensitive on the
extensive margin (e.g., Nieswiadomy, 1985; Ogg and Gollehon, 1989; Frasier
and Pfeiffer, 1994; Schoengold et al., 2006; Hendricks and Peterson, 2012;
Scheierling et al., 2006; Pfeiffer and Lin, forthcoming). Moreover, climate
variables are highly random year to year. Since the public power districts
set the energy price before the irrigation season starts and thus before the
climate unfolds for that year, they cannot condition their energy price upon
climate for the corresponding year, if this were their intention. These three
factors make highly unlikely any omitted variable bias due to not including
energy price. We do include the national corn price in the model as a proxy
for the actual corn price farmers in Nebraska experienced.
12The currently available soil data for the regions studied here, such as the Soil Survey
Geographic (SSURGO) database, do not report soil characteristics over time because they
do not change significantly over the short time period.
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1.5.3 Estimating Equation
After the discussions on econometric strategy so far, the econometric model
can be expressed as
Wi,y =γ0 + γ1CPy +
Kf∑
j=0
αj
( Ty∑
t=1
bj(Ri,t,y, Kf )
)
+
Kg∑
j=0
βj
( Ty∑
t=1
bj(cETi,t,y, Kg)
)
+ µi + εi,y (1.11)
where CPy is the corn price in year y and bj(·, K) is the jth Bernstein basis
polynomial of degree K. We set α0 and β0 to be 0 (or equivalently, b0(·, KR)
and b0(·, KE) are dropped from the estimating equation) because they are
confounded with the intercept and are not estimable13. Therefore, the esti-
mating equation is
Wi,y =γ0 + γ1CPy +
Kf∑
j=1
αj
( Ty∑
t=1
bj(Ri,t,y, Kf )
)
+
Kg∑
j=1
βj
( Ty∑
t=1
bj(cETi,t,y, Kg)
)
+ µi + εi,y (1.12)
1.5.4 Monotonicity
Non-parametric or semi-parametric regressions may overfit the data and the
estimated functions can be unrealistically wiggly. Therefore, they are often
accompanied by some form of regulation to smooth out the estimated func-
tion. For example, for non-parametric regression using a kernel function, a
bandwidth is chosen such that the estimated function is neither too wiggly
nor too smooth. In a semi-parametric regression using splines, a penalty on
the wiggliness of the function (most commonly the integral of the squared
second-order derivative of the function) is placed when minimizing estimation
criteria such as the sum of the squared residual in OLS. The most commonly
used way of selecting the optimal degree of regulation is Generalized Cross
Validation (GCV). The optimally smoothed function via GCV, however, can
still be overly wiggly (Wood, 2006). However, when the function to be esti-
13This unidentifiability is akin to that in SR. The intercept simply becomes γ0+α0+β0.
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mated is expected to have certain shape characteristics, an alternative way
to regulate the estimated function is to impose a shape restriction. In our
case, agronomic and irrigation theories strongly suggest that the impacts of
precipitation and ET on irrigation are monotone non-increasing and non-
decreasing, respectively. Technical details on imposing monotonicity using
Bernstein basis polynomials are outlined in Appendix A.3.
1.5.5 Standard Error of the Estimator
Failure to take into account spatial dependence of error can lead to a con-
siderable underestimation of the standard error when an agriculture-related
variable is the subject of an empirical analysis (e.g., Schlenker et al., 2006).
This point is likely to hold in our particular setting as well. It is also impor-
tant to take into account autocorrelation in a panel data analysis (Bertrand
et al., 2004). Therefore, we will employ a double block bootstrap method
where each block consists of time-series observations of a well and those of its
spatial neighbors (see Appendix A.5 for the details of sampling procedure.).
Our procedure can be considered a variant of robust inference with two-way
clustering (e.g., Cameron et al., 2011).
1.6 Regression Results
1.6.1 Precipitation
The upper panel of Figure 1.6 presents the histogram of precipitation, ex-
cluding days without any precipitation, to provide a sense of which portion
of the estimated functions is most relevant in terms of its frequency. The ma-
jority of precipitation events fall within 0 to 1 inches. In the bottom panel
of Figure 1.6, the red line represents the estimated functions of the impacts
of precipitation on seasonal irrigation water use relative to the baseline (a
day without any precipitation) from the regression results on observed data.
The blue line represents the counterpart in AquaCrop-generated irrigation
data with a hypothetical farmer following the 65% target soil moisture rule.
Estimated functions for other strategies are similar and not presented for the
sake of clarity in the figure. Shaded regions represent their 95% confidence
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intervals. Figure 1.6 also presents a one-to-one line, indicating 100% effi-
ciency of precipitation use. As expected, the estimated function is above the
one-to-one line for the entire range of precipitation historically observed.
Interpretation of the regression results is a little trickier than ordinary
parametric regression results. Recall that the first Bernstein basis polyno-
mial is dropped for both precipitation and ET. Therefore, the estimated
function represents the change in seasonal irrigation water use, relative to
their baselines, for one day with no precipitation and zero corn ET, respec-
tively. For example, when one day in an irrigation season with an inch of
precipitation is replaced by a day with no precipitation, seasonal irrigation
water use would be greater by about 0.4 inches, according to our estimates
based on observed data. It is also important to note that the estimated curve
cannot indicate what happens on that specific day. Using the above example,
the increase of 0.4 inches in irrigation does not necessarily happen on the day
with 1 inch of precipitation.
For precipitation of 1.5 inches or more, the estimated responses in seasonal
irrigation are similar. Figure 1.7 focuses on the estimated functions for the
range of 0 to 1 inch. As can be seen in the figure, the estimated response using
synthesized data overstates the impact of precipitation on seasonal irrigation
water use. This is in contrast to the seemingly overly reactive response to the
lack of precipitation by farmers in Georgia observed by Guerra et al. (2005).
1.6.2 Crop ET
As with Figure 1.6, Figure 1.8 presents the histogram of corn ET on the
top panel. The bottom panel shows the estimated function of the impacts
of daily corn ET (at the bottom) relative to the baseline (a day with zero
corn ET) for both observed and AquaCrop-simulated irrigation data. The
interpretation is the same as for precipitation. For example, regression results
with observed data suggest that when one day in an irrigation season with
zero ET is replaced by a day with ET of 0.4, groundwater consumption would
increase about 0.07 inches ceteris paribus. Estimated functions stay at zero
for the range of 0 to 0.2 inches of corn ET, meaning that farmers irrigate
the same amount irrespective of corn ET for the range. After 0.2 inches
of corn ET, farmers start to irrigate more as corn ET increases. This is in
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stark contrast to the estimated function for a hypothetical farmer who follows
a soil moisture target strategy mechanically as programmed in AquaCrop.
An estimated response function for the hypothetical farmer is located above
that for real farmers for the entire range of corn ET with large margins.
This indicates that the hypothetical farmer responds much more strongly to
changes in corn ET.
This comparison, however, may not be fair as corn ET for the observed data
should have measurement errors to some extent because they are calculated
by running AquaCrop. Therefore, it is possible that the sharp contrast is
an artifact of attenuation bias on regression results from the observed data.
In order to see if this is the case, we introduce measurement errors on the
synthesized data to make comparisons on a level playing field by taking the
following steps:
1. Choose the maximum percentage of error for daily corn ET.
2. For each observation, find the minimum of the ratio of its value to the
maximum corn ET historically observed and the percentage set in the
previous step.
3. Name the number found in the previous step MEi, where i indicates
observation i.
4. Multiply observation i by 1 + v, where v ∼ Unif(−MEi,MEi).
We tried 10% to 50% with a step of 10% as the maximum error. Multiplica-
tive error was chosen to avoid negative values in corn ET. This procedure
includes the observations with errors, but disturbs the distribution within
the range of historically observed corn ET. Allowing a high value of corn ET
to have 50% will produce an unrealistically high corn ET.
Figure 1.9 compares regression results on synthesized data with errors
(no error, 30%, and 50%) with those on observed data. As expected, severe
attenuation biases are caused to those with mismeasurement, diminishing the
gap. Nonetheless, even with 50% measurement errors, a hypothetical farmer
programmed in AquaCrop is still more responsive to changes in climate than
actual farmers are.
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1.6.3 Nonlinearity of the Impacts of Climate Variables
Figure 1.10 illustrates the difference between regression results based on time-
disaggregated nonlinear and time-aggregated linear estimations. Remember
that 75% of daily precipitation events fall within the range of 0 to 0.5 inches.
Within this range, nonlinear and linear functions are similar. For larger
values of precipitation, however, linear estimation overstates the impact of
precipitation on seasonal irrigation. It would seem that the linear fit should
be tilted further upward toward the nonlinear estimated function. However,
that is not the case, because the linear model puts much more weight on the
lower range of precipitation when fitting the line as the majority of precipi-
tation events are observed within 0 to 1 inch.
Figure 1.11 compares linear and nonlinear estimates of the impacts of corn
ET. The linear function overstates the impact of corn ET for a lower range
of corn ET (up to about 0.3 inches) and then understates for a higher range.
The degree of errors is noticeably greater for the larger range of corn ET.
This indicates that using linear estimation to calculate the impact of climate
change is likely to downscale the impact estimated by a nonlinear function.
1.7 Discussion and Policy Implications
After comparing regression results based on the observed and synthesized
data, accompanied by a sensitivity check of the results to measurement errors,
we found that farmers may not be responding to corn ET as much as would
a hypothetical farmer following target soil moisture strategies.
There are several reasons that may cause the divergence in irrigation be-
havior between actual and hypothetical farmers. First of all, farmers are un-
likely to have perfect information about the state of their soil moisture, while
the hypothetical farmer has complete information about it. Even though au-
tomatic soil moisture detectors are available in the market, adoption of this
technology is still not widespread. As an irrigation guidebook published by
University of Nebraska Extension Services suggests, feeling the soil texture
by hand is the primary method used by farmers. Second, farmers may not
pay much attention to the soil moisture level. The pumping cost is so low
that the perceived benefit of conserving water by scheduling irrigation based
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on soil moisture may also be low 14. A soil moisture target irrigation strategy
is, of course, not completely unrealistic. Indeed, some farmers have started
irrigating in exactly this manner by computerizing and automating the irri-
gation timing and amount according to the target strategy. This technology,
however, is still experimental and is unlikely to be widely used, especially in
developing countries, due to its cost. Therefore, for the foreseeable future,
farmers are unlikely to be as responsive to climate variability as simulation
models suggest.
Strong response to climate variability by the hypothetical farmer relative to
actual farmers has an important implication: simulation models like LPJmL,
EPIC, and pDSSAT or AquaCrop may overstate the impact of climate change
on current actual irrigation water use. In the near future, farmers are unlikely
to modify their irrigation behavior according to the target strategy with
perfect information on the state of soil moisture. Moreover, as irrigation
water use plays a central role in GGCM and GHM, assuming an irrigation
trigger strategy may result in errors in other interactive parts of the model,
such as fresh water availability, the hydrological cycle, and food production.
1.8 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
This study used an econometric approach to examine the impacts of cli-
mate variability on irrigation water use. We contributed to the economet-
ric analysis of irrigation water demand by developing an econometric model
that incorporates time-variant crop water needs with knowledge gleaned from
agronomy and irrigation science literature. We also contributed to the liter-
ature by capturing the nonlinear response of irrigation water use to climate
variables, confirming that linearity assumptions can lead to severe bias.
Reduced-form regression analysis is not capable of modeling dynamic in-
teractions between various environmental factors and crops. However, it
allows us to implicitly capture behavioral aspects of irrigation decision mak-
ing, which cannot be modeled in existing simulations. Indeed, we found that
real farmers are not as responsive to climate variability as are hypothetical
14The cost of applying a unit of water depends on the energy cost to pump the water
from the aquifer and the price of water itself. For farmers in our study, the cost of irrigation
depends only on energy price as water price is zero.
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farmers in these simulations. This is an important finding because it imme-
diately translates into errors in fresh water availability. It may also cause
errors in other key outcomes in GGCM and GHM as irrigation water use is
the core component of these models.
In showing the difference between irrigation response to climate variability
by actual and hypothetical farmers, we took a rather circuitous path. More
important, while we can detect the difference, we cannot detect the reason
for it. We have posited potential reasons for the difference; however, they
cannot be tested with the current data. Given that irrigation strategy can
make a large difference in irrigation water use, it is important to understand
farmers’ irrigation behavior more precisely. To this end, real-time data on
soil moisture as well as irrigation timing and amounts would be ideal.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: Evapotranspiration Breakdown within an Irrigation Season of
2012
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Figure 1.2: Map of Wells in Upper Republican Natural Resource District,
Nebraska
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Figure 1.3: Selected Wells in URNRD, Nebraska
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Figure 1.4: Historical Groundwater Consumption in URNRD
lll
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
0
20
40
60
80
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
Year
W
a
te
r E
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
(in
ch
es
)
Figure 1.5: Historical Precipitation and Corn ET in URNRD
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Figure 1.6: Groundwater Consumption and Precipitation
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Figure 1.7: Groundwater Consumption and Precipitation (Limited Range)
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Figure 1.8: Groundwater Consumption and Evapotranspiration
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Figure 1.9: Comparison with Measurement Errors in Synthesized Data
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Figure 1.10: Groundwater Consumption and Precipitation: Model
Comparison
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Figure 1.11: Groundwater Consumption and Evapotranspiration: Model
Comparison
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Evapotranspiration (inches)
Ch
an
ge
 in
 W
a
te
r C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
(in
ch
es
)
Estimated Function
Linear Model
31
CHAPTER 2
ENERGY SUPPLY INTERRUPTION,
DROUGHT, AND WATER
CONSERVATION
2.1 Introduction
This study examines the relationships between climate, water use, and energy
use in groundwater-fed irrigated agriculture. Irrigation is used worldwide to
buffer agricultural production against climate variability and accounts for
more than half of all global freshwater consumption (Naylor, 1996; Shah
et al., 2003). Groundwater is a major source of water for irrigation; this
practice has contributed substantially to aquifer depletion worldwide (Malik,
2002; Siebert and Do¨ll, 2010; Scanlon et al., 2012; Wada et al., 2012). Pump-
ing water out of aquifers uses energy, and energy use for groundwater-fed
irrigation varies over space and time with crop water demands and weather.
Thus, there is a strong climate-energy-water nexus (Scott et al., 2011; Scott,
2013). These linkages mean that public policies and contract terms designed
for either factor - energy or water - may affect the use of the other factor.
Indeed, irrigation water use by farmers was altered drastically by an energy
industry reform in India, as discussed in Shah et al. (2008). Energy supply
capacity and water resources are both constrained in many areas. Therefore,
building an understanding of the interactions between energy and water use
is an important prerequisite to effective joint management of these scarce
resources. The focus of our study is the impact of energy supply interrup-
tion on irrigation behavior and the resulting consequences on groundwater
resources.
The need to manage peak energy loads has led many power suppliers to
introduce interruptible energy supply contracts. This stochasticity of energy
supply may influence the water use choices of irrigators with implications
for water resource management. Further, these relationships may also be
affected by changes in rainfall and temperature patterns since they strongly
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influence crop water needs. The problem farmers face under energy supply
interruption is similar to the continuous-review inventory problem in opera-
tional research. The key differences, however, are that stock (soil moisture
content) decays naturally over time and that stock affects revenue (crop
growth) nonlinearly. To the authors’ knowledge, this kind of problem has
not yet been studied in the economics literature.
The three main research objectives considered in this paper are to 1) under-
stand how profit-maximizing farmers adjust their irrigation strategy under
energy supply interruption as opposed to the case of no control, 2) exam-
ine if energy supply interruptions increase or decrease total groundwater
consumption, and 3) understand how climate variation affects groundwater
consumption under energy supply interruption.
We develop and solve a stochastic dynamic programming problem in which
producers decide when and how much to irrigate throughout the crop growth
season. The model uses a probabilistic interruptible energy supply and
stochastic rainfall. Analytical optimality conditions show that when energy
supply interruption is present, farmers increase the amount of irrigation when
they can in anticipation of potential interruptions in input supply. We fur-
ther found that increasing the likelihood of energy supply interruption has
an ambiguous impact on the total amount of irrigation. Numerical examples
using a stochastic crop water production function calibrated to conditions in
the US state of Nebraska, where groundwater extraction spawned a Supreme
Court decree limiting use, suggest that total firm-level water demand is likely
to increase as a consequence of energy supply interruption.
Section 2 discusses the phenomenon of energy supply interruption. Section
3 reviews pertinent literature. Sections 4-6 present a formal decision model,
analytical results, and numerical examples, respectively. Section 7 discusses
policy implications and extensions.
2.2 Energy Supply Interruption
Public energy suppliers have introduced a number of demand-side manage-
ment (DSM) measures to manage energy peak loads (Eto, 1996). Direct
irrigation load control, which involves cuts in energy supply, is one form of
DSM. In this case, producers may be faced with energy supply interruptions
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meant to curtail peak energy loads. In the U.S., such programs are imple-
mented in regions with heavy groundwater-fed irrigation such as Nebraska,
Kansas, and Idaho. Irrigation load control takes place primarily in July and
August, when the demand for electricity is the greatest. As an example,
Table 2.2 shows the total hours of load control implemented by the Custer
Public Power District (PPD) in Nebraska. Under n day control, farmers face
up to 12-hour energy supply cutoffs for a maximum of n days a week.
Direct irrigation load control programs usually offer farmers a choice of
contracts with varying levels of restrictions on the ability to irrigate, accom-
panied by some form of financial incentive to compensate for the increased
risk in irrigation scheduling. Table 2.1 provides an example of energy con-
tracts offered by the Custer PPD. The unit price of electricity for no power
control is about twice as high as that for interruptible contracts. Other pub-
lic power districts lower the unit cost of the horsepower of a water pump,
which is a sunk cost once an irrigation season starts. Energy suppliers set
financial incentives generously to encourage producers to choose a contract
with energy supply interruption that gives suppliers more control over the
peak energy load. Consequently, many producers opt into energy supply
interruption, even though the total hours with no energy supply can be sig-
nificant.
2.3 Literature Review
One common DSM is time-of-use (TOU) rates, which differentiate marginal
energy prices depending on time of day. The numerous empirical studies on
the impacts of energy DSM programs are primarily focused on the impact
of TOU rates on residential energy consumption behavior (e.g. Aigner and
Leamer, 1984; Caves et al., 1984; Howrey and Varian, 1984; Park and Acton,
1984; Hausman and Trimble, 1984). In economics, to the author’s knowl-
edge, Train and Toyama (1989) is the only study that looks at the impact
of an energy DSM program on the agricultural sector1. This study found
empirically that energy TOU rates shift consumers’ electricity use from on-
peak hours to off-peak hours, contributing to a reduction in the peak load.
1The chronic lack of data on agricultural water use is the likely cause of this scant
empirical analysis.
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Moreover, they find that total electricity use increased since the decrease in
the price during the off-peak period was more than enough to make up for
the increased price during the on-peak periods. However, the study did not
make the connection that the increased energy use implies greater water use.
Outside of economics, Scott (2013) provides some evidence of increases in
water consumption after the introduction of energy TOU rates in Mexico,
though the study does not conduct rigorous statistical examination. On the
other hand, energy supply interruption differs from TOU rates in that it
adds uncertainty in input availability. No economic work has studied rig-
orously how this added uncertainty would affect irrigation behavior and its
consequence on groundwater conservation. We contribute to the literature
of energy and water management by analyzing their interconnection: in par-
ticular, the impact of energy supply interruptibility on irrigation.
The dynamic optimization problem considered in this study falls into the
class of intra-seasonal water allocation (irrigation scheduling) problems. The
overarching theme underlying the literature is the optimal timing and amount
of irrigation throughout the irrigation season. This arises from the fact that
simply satisfying crop water needs fully may be neither possible nor desirable
at times. The most prominent physical constraint studied is the limit on
water availability, which clearly necessitates allocating a limited amount of
water within the irrigation season (e.g. Bras and Cordova, 1981; Rhenals
and Bras, 1981; Rao et al., 1990; Prasad et al., 2006). When the goal is
maximizing profit, one needs to balance the cost and benefit of irrigation,
even if water availability is not a limiting factor (e.g. Bras and Cordova,
1981; Rhenals and Bras, 1981; McGuckin et al., 1987; Yaron and Dinar,
1989). These irrigation strategies that deviate from full irrigation are called
deficit irrigation in the agronomy and irrigation science literature. There
has been renewed and growing interest in deficit irrigation as the pressure
for water conservation in the agricultural sector is increasing. Our study
contributes to the literature by examining the impact of input (water) supply
interruptibility, which has not been studied previously.
Previous studies have employed a numerical stochastic dynamic program-
ming approach because of its ability to incorporate the complicated dynamic
system integrating crop, soil, and atmosphere and inherent uncertainty in
climatic conditions. Recent studies, in particular, take advantage of recent
advances in computational power and the global optimization technique (e.g.
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Paly and Zell, 2009; Brown et al., 2010; Cai et al., 2011). As Shani et al.
(2004) point out, numerical studies are somewhat ad hoc as their results
pertain only to the specific contexts considered. Shani et al. (2004) use opti-
mal control theory to find a generalizable solution to the optimal irrigation
scheduling problem. The optional solution they find is a turnpike strategy,
in which a fixed level of soil moisture is reached as soon as possible and
then maintained throughout the season. Our study takes a mostly analyti-
cal approach to develop generalizable economic insights into the impacts of
energy supply interruption that are derived from solving and analyzing the
optimality conditions.
2.4 The Model
2.4.1 Single Period Payoff
We model crop growth as a function of soil moisture level, following previous
studies on irrigation scheduling. Since plants take in water, along with nutri-
ents, only through their roots, soil moisture is the key variable that governs
the relationship between irrigation and crop growth. While other inputs such
as fertilizers are key inputs that determine crop growth, this study focuses
on soil moisture level when water is the limiting factor, as is commonly done
in the agronomy literature (Steduto et al., 2009; Raes et al., 2009). Payoff
for each period is written as follows: Y (St)− Pw · xt. The first term, Y (St),
represents incremental crop growth as a function of soil moisture level, St,
at time t. Crop growth is assumed to be increasing with soil moisture level
at a decreasing rate, Y ′(·) > 0 and Y ′′(·) < 0. The crop-water function will
be kept unspecified throughout the theoretical investigation2. As a conse-
quence, the optimal solution concept will be quite general. Pw is the unit
pumping cost of water relative to the price of the crop (numeraire) and Xt
is the amount of irrigation3. Therefore, single period payoff is crop growth
2An analytical solution for optimal irrigation is possible for a very limited class of crop-
water functions and under the assumption of non-random temperature and rainfall. While
an analytical solution could make comparative statics easier to derive, these assumptions
severely limit the applicability of the derived economic insights.
3Unit pumping cost can differ across farmers even with the same price for electricity
because of differences in pumping efficiency.
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(equivalent to revenue) less pumping cost.
It is well known that the water requirement of a crop differs depending
on its growing stage. In this study, however, we work with a fixed crop-
water function over time because it will not change the economic insights
into adaptation to random power supply interruptions.
2.4.2 State Equation
Soil moisture level decays over time due to transpiration, evaporation, and
deep percolation. Irrigation and rainfall supplement the soil moisture. This
process is represented mathematically as St+1 = α(βSt + θ · Xt + Rt). The
proportion of the soil moisture that remains after crop consumption (tran-
spiration) is represented by β ∈ [0, 1], which varies by type of crop. The
proportion of soil moisture remaining after percolation and evaporation is
represented by α ∈ [0, 1]. The rate of percolation varies depending on the
soil type; for example, percolation is greater with sandy soil than with silty
soil. Not all water applied reaches the soil, however, due to evaporation and
surface runoff. The proportion of the applied water that goes into the soil,
irrigation efficiency, is represented by θ ∈ [0, 1]. Irrigation efficiency varies
depending on irrigation technology: Irrigation efficiency for center pivot ir-
rigation is about 90% as opposed to 60% for flood irrigation. In addition to
irrigation, stochastic rainfall, represented by Rt, also adds to the soil moisture
level. The distribution of rainfall is kept unspecified throughout an irriga-
tion season, and agricultural producers are allowed to act on their subjective
beliefs about rainfall events.
The key property of the state equation is that the water loss due to tran-
spiration, evaporation, deep percolation, and surface runoff is greater when
the starting soil moisture is higher, which is a well-established fact in the ir-
rigation science literature. This implies that farmers may reduce the amount
of seasonal irrigation by not keeping the soil consistently wet as this avoids
non-beneficial loss of water from the soil. Moreover, marginal crop growth
becomes negligible at a certain soil moisture level below the field capacity.
These two properties make full irrigation (irrigating to keep the soil consis-
tently wet), a highly non-economical and water-wasting irrigation strategy
(Wriedt et al., 2009).
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2.4.3 Agricultural Producer’s Problem
The agricultural producer’s problem is to maximize the expected value of
profit given the state equation and random energy supply interruption. This
problem is written mathematically as follows:
max
xt
E
[
T∑
t=1
Y (St)− Pw · xt
]
s.t St+1 = α(βSt + θ · xt +Rt)
xt = 0 with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1] (2.1)
The final crop yield at the end of the production season is assumed to be the
summation of incremental crop growth in each period over the production
season. The additivity of crop yield is commonly used in the optimal irriga-
tion scheduling literature (e.g., Bras and Cordova, 1981; Cai et al., 2011)4.
The unique feature of the model is that the control variable is set at 0
for probability ρ. The probability of energy supply interruption is assumed
to be fixed over the irrigation season even though it may be predicted by
observing future and past climatic conditions. Nonetheless, this assumption
does not interfere with deriving economic insights, and detailed updating of
subjective belief should be left to a numerical analysis. The model does not
have a intra-seasonal discount factor because an irrigation season is short
enough that any discount should be negligible. Finite time is appropriate
considering that the end period is clearly defined. In this study, no limit is
placed on the well yield: we assume it to be high enough that producers can
apply as much water as they desire for a given time period. However, this
assumption certainly would not hold for some wells. Agricultural producers
with low well yield may not be able to irrigate as much as they desire, thus
potentially limiting their capability to adapt to random energy outages. For
example, in northwest Texas, the yield of some wells was so low that in 2011
their owners could not meet crop water requirements even without energy
supply interruption, resulting in severe production loss. On the other hand,
4While some of the agronomy literature claims that additive models are unrealistic in
that they do not allow for the existence of the wilting point, it is only because the additive
model is often written in a very restricted way. It is indeed possible to allow for the wilting
point by letting Y (St) take negative values that are large in magnitude at the lower range
of soil moisture level.
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most of the wells for irrigation in Nebraska still have quite a high yield (see
Appendix for further detail).
Along with these assumptions, there are several minor technical assump-
tions that are used in our mathematical proofs. It is assumed that lim
S→0
Y ′(S) <
C for some positive constant C (assumption 1). This assumption simply
states that the marginal production of soil moisture is bounded and does not
approach infinity as the soil moisture level moves infinitesimally close to 0.
The optimization problem is not well defined without this assumption. It is
also assumed that St > αβSt + αE[Rt],
∀St ∈ R+ and ∀t (assumption 2).
This assumption states that given the current soil moisture St, the expected
amount of rainfall is small enough that the expected value of soil moisture in
the next period is smaller than St if no water is applied at the current period.
This assumption does not limit the practical relevance of our model because
irrigation would not be necessary in the first place if the assumptions were
not satisfied.
2.5 Solutions and Results
In this section, we establish the first order condition of the optimal irrigation
schedule problem with random energy supply interruption, find the value
functions, and then derive comparative statics.
2.5.1 Bellman Equations
Let Vt(S, 0) and Vt(S, 1) denote the value function at time t given soil mois-
ture level S when energy is and is not available, respectively. The Bellman
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equations of the dynamic optimization problem for time t are then as follows:
Vt(S, 1) =Maxx∈R+ Y (S)− Pwx+ ρE
[
Vt+1
(
α(βS + θx+Rt), 0
)]
+ (1− ρ)E
[
Vt+1
(
α(βS + θx+Rt), 1
)]
(2.2)
Vt(S, 0) =Maxx∈{0} Y (S)− Pwx+ ρE
[
Vt+1
(
α(βS + θx+Rt), 0
)]
+ (1− ρ)E
[
Vt+1
(
α(βS + θx+Rt), 1
)]
=Y (S) + ρE
[
Vt+1
(
α(βS +Rt), 0
)]
+ E
[
(1− ρ)Vt+1
(
α(βS +Rt), 1
)]
(2.3)
where expectation is taken over Rt. When finding the optimal irrigation
amount, producers need to consider how irrigation influences the stream of
future profits as well as the immediate return. Here, the immediate return
is incremental crop revenue, Y (S), less pumping cost, Pwx. Future profits
are uncertain because of the stochasticity of energy supply and rainfall. Pro-
ducers’ transition to the state with or without energy supply in the next
period has probability ρ and 1 − ρ, respectively. The expected maximum
profits from t + 1 onward, conditional on irrigation at t, are represented by
ρE
[
Vt+1
(
α(βS + θx+Rt), 0
)]
and (1− ρ)E
[
Vt+1
(
α(βS + θx+Rt), 1
)]
, for
the states with or without energy supply interruption, respectively. Thus, the
summation of the two terms represents the expected future profit. The Bell-
man equation represented by equation 2.2 states that the maximum cumula-
tive profit starting in the current period, with the energy currently available,
is equal to the summation of the immediate profit and the expected value
of the maximum profit from the next period onward. When energy is not
available in the current period, irrigation is necessarily zero, and thus the
Bellman equation reduces to equation 2.3.
2.5.2 Optimal Irrigation Strategy
Using backward induction, value functions and optimal irrigation strategies
can be found sequentially from the end period to the first period (See Ap-
pendix B.1 for the proof). Along with solving the problem, the following
proposition can be established that helps explain the economic meaning of
the first order condition:
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Proposition 1 : Optimal irrigation strategy has the following form for all
t:
x∗t =
σt
θ
− β
θ
St (2.4)
where σt is a constant that depends on all of the parameters and the dis-
tributions of all the rainfall events from time t on, but does not depend on
St.
This proposition has several important implications. When the above ir-
rigation strategy is followed, the soil moisture level in the next period before
deep percolation and evaporation takes place is σt if there is no rain. There-
fore, σt can be interpreted as the minimum amount of soil moisture level
guaranteed irrespective of the amount of rainfall in that period before deep
percolation and evaporation loss. That is, the profit-maximizing agricultural
producer will irrigate just as much as necessary to fill the gap between the
current and the target soil moisture (σt) levels, independent of the current
soil moisture level.
The expected value of the soil moisture level given the current soil moisture
level St is the following:
E[St+1] = E[α(βSt + θx
∗
t +Rt)] = E[α(σt +Rt)]
Since σt is independent of St, E[St+1] is also independent of St. This further
means that if the distribution of rainfall events is stationary, agricultural
producers will try to keep the same level of expected soil moisture whenever
they can irrigate, except for the last few periods. In the last few periods, the
expected value of irrigation decreases because the soil moisture is assumed
to have no value after harvest. Meanwhile, when the rainfall variable is not
stationary, the soil moisture target will vary over time. However, the ex-
pected soil moisture level remains independent of the current soil moisture
level. This leads to the following corollaries:
Corollary 1 : Irrigation and rainfall in the current periods have no impact
on future soil moisture levels for all periods after energy supply interruption
ends, except in the next period.
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The key insight from proposition 1 is that whenever irrigation is possible,
the soil moisture level will be targeted at a fixed level independent of the
starting soil moisture level. Therefore, irrigation and rainfall in the current
period will only have an effect on future soil moisture as long as energy
supply is continuous. For example, any additional irrigation at t will have
no effect on the soil moisture level at t + 2 if irrigation is allowed at t +
1. This corollary is important in understanding the first order condition.
Analogously, a similar corollary holds for rainfall.
2.5.3 First Order Condition
In order to understand the first order condition, it is instructive to first look
at the case with no energy supply interruption (ρ = 0). The first order
condition at T − k (k = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1) is the following:
Pw =θαE
[
Y ′
(
α(βST−k + θx+RT−k)
)]
+
αβPw
θ
(2.5)
The left-hand side is the marginal cost of pumping. The marginal benefit of
water, represented on the right-hand side, consists of two parts. The first
term represents the marginal expected revenue due to crop growth in the
next period from adding one more unit of water in the current period. The
second term represents the cost savings in the next period from adding one
more unit of water in the current period. The cost savings occur because
an additional unit of irrigation leads to a higher soil moisture level in the
next period, which in turn reduces the optimal amount of irrigation required
in the next period. Agricultural producers need to be concerned about the
impact of irrigation on soil moisture only in the next period, but not in future
periods, which is an immediate consequence of Corollary 1.
The essential structure of the first order condition remains the same for
the case with nonzero probability of energy supply interruption (ρ > 0). The
first order condition at T − k (k = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1) is (see Appendix B.1 for
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derivation):
Pw =θ
k∑
i=1
αiρi−1βi−1E
[
Y ′
(
αiβi−1(βST−k + θx) +
i∑
j=1
αjβj−1RT−k−j+i
)]
+ (1− ρ)αβ · Pw
[
k−1∑
j=1
(αβρ)j−1
]
(2.6)
The first term on the right-hand side of the first order condition is the sum-
mation of expected marginal crop growth (or, equivalently, revenue, because
the crop is the numeraire). Each term is conditioned on continued power out-
age, adjusted for the portion of irrigation remaining in the soil moisture. For
example, denoting the current period t, the second term in the summation
represents marginal crop growth at t + 2 if energy is not available at t + 1.
The third term is the expected marginal crop growth that may be realized
at t + 3 if energy was not available in the previous two consecutive periods.
Following from proposition 1 and its corollary, agricultural producers need to
consider the impact of irrigation only for the periods that have experienced
consecutive energy outages. For example, agricultural producers do not have
to account for how irrigation at time t would affect crop growth at t + 2 if
energy is already available at t+ 1.
Analogously, each term in the second summation term represents the ex-
pected marginal cost savings conditioned on sustained power outage, ad-
justed for the portion of irrigation remaining in the soil moisture. Each term
is multiplied by 1 − ρ because cost savings are realized only when farmers
can irrigate, which occurs with probability 1 − ρ. For example, the second
term in the summation is the expected cost savings that are realized two
periods later if farmers cannot irrigate in the next period, but can irrigate
two periods later.
The first order condition encapsulates this economic intuition: agricultural
producers need to take into account now the impact of irrigation on the soil
moisture levels in future periods. This compares to the case of no energy
supply interruption, when producers do not need to account for the impact
of current irrigation on future soil moisture because they can irrigate in any
period.
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2.5.4 Comparative Statics
Energy Supply Interruption
Proposition 2 : Random energy supply interruption always leads to an
increase in the optimal amount of irrigation per irrigation opportunity (see
Appendix B.2 for the proof):
∂X∗t
∂ρ
> 0
This finding is consistent with our expectation and quite intuitive: producers
increase irrigation to hedge against the risk of not being able to irrigate in
future periods. An immediate consequence of this proposition is that the
optimal target soil moisture level goes up as the probability of energy supply
interruption increases.
From the groundwater conservation perspective, the total amount of irri-
gation is more important than the amount of irrigation per irrigation oppor-
tunity, which does not necessarily lead to an increase in the total amount
of irrigation because farmers have fewer opportunities to irrigate. The ques-
tion is whether the increase in irrigation per irrigation opportunity is large
enough to make up for the loss of irrigation opportunities.
We found that the sign of the impact cannot be determined definitively;
thus the question is empirical 5. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify con-
ditions that are more likely to lead to an increase in the total amount of
irrigation: 1) the crop-growth function has a very steep slope (high marginal
production of water) at the lower range of soil moisture and 2) the slope of
the crop-growth function flattens very fast after the steep slope. In other
words, a large loss in crop growth will be incurred when even a small amount
of water is not supplied due to an energy outage. In order to avoid a poten-
tially large loss, producers need to irrigate more when they can. A rapidly
declining slope of the crop-water function (rapidly declining marginal pro-
duction of water) means that the optimal soil moisture level would be very
close to the high slope portion of the crop-water function if it were not for
5The mathematical expression for the derivative of total irrigation with respect to the
probability of energy supply interruption is convoluted and not presented here. Please see
the Appendix for more.
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energy supply interruption. Therefore, the risk caused by energy interruption
is high when the crop-water function has a rapidly declining slope after its
steep-sloped portion. Thus, an increase in the probability of energy supply
interruption is more likely to result in an increase in the total amount of
irrigation if the crop-water function satisfies the above conditions.
Rainfall
An important difference between the first order conditions with and without
energy supply interruption is the role of rainfall events. For the case with no
energy supply interruption, agricultural producers need to consider only the
distribution of rainfall in the same period, as can be seen in equation 2.5.
This leads to the following lemmas:
Lemma 1 : When energy supply interruption is not present, a change in the
distribution of rainfall at t will influence decision making only at t.
On the other hand, when the probability of energy supply interruption is
nonzero, all rainfall events from the current period until the end period enter
the decision-making process because farmers need to take into account the
expected future soil moisture levels due to potential energy outages. This
leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 2 : A change in the distribution of rainfall in period s will influence
decision making in period s and all following periods if energy supply inter-
ruption is possible.
Lemmas 1 and 2 immediately lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 : Information about the distribution of future rainfall events
is more valuable when energy supply interruption is possible than otherwise.
These results hold for any kind of change in the distribution of rainfall in
general. Now we consider specifically the implications of two aspects of
the distribution of rainfall: expected rainfall (E[R]) and variance (mean-
preserving spread).
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First, it can be shown that the marginal impact of the expected rainfall
in t on the optimal amount of irrigation in t is negative and of the same
magnitude with or without energy supply interruption (see Appendix B.4):
∂xt∗
∂γt
∣∣∣
ρ=0
=
∂xt∗
∂γt
∣∣∣
ρ>0
= −1
θ
< 0 (2.7)
This implies that independent of energy supply interruption, the expected to-
tal groundwater consumption will decrease (increase) when expected rainfall
increases (decreases). Second, an increase in the expected value of a rainfall
event in a future period s(> t) will reduce the optimal amount of irrigation
when energy supply interruption is present, but has no effect otherwise (See
Appendix B.4):
∂xt∗
∂γs
∣∣∣
ρ=0
= 0 and
∂xt∗
∂γs
∣∣∣
ρ>0
< 0 (2.8)
The insensitivity of optimal irrigation to a reduction in the expected value
of future rainfall events is a direct consequence of Lemma 1. Combining the
two findings results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 : The optimal irrigation per irrigation opportunity is more
elastic to the expected value of future rainfall events with energy supply
interruption than without it.
T∑
s=t
∂xt∗
∂γs
∣∣∣
ρ=0
>
T∑
s=t
∂xt∗
∂γs
∣∣∣
ρ>0
(2.9)
For example, if the expected value of rainfall in t and t + 1 decreases, the
increase in the optimal amount of irrigation in t is greater when energy supply
interruption is present.
This, however, does not mean the expected total groundwater consumption
experiences a larger increase in response to a decrease in the expected value
of rainfall events when there is energy supply interruption than otherwise.
In fact, this cannot be signed definitively and remains an empirical question.
This is analogous with the case of the impact of energy supply interruption
on the total amount of groundwater consumption, discussed above. When
the probability of energy supply interruption is high, producers have fewer
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opportunities to irrigate.
Now comes the question of how a change in uncertainty about future rain-
fall events influences the optimal irrigation strategy. Quite intuitively, it
can be shown that a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of a rainfall
event in future periods will lead to an increase in the amount of optimal
irrigation per irrigation opportunity, irrespective of the presence of energy
supply interruption (see Appendix B.5). With a slight abuse of mathematical
notation,
∂xt∗
∂V ar(Rt)
∣∣∣
ρ≥0
> 0 (2.10)
This is because a mean-preserving spread will increase the risk of crop yield
reduction. Therefore, a mean-preserving spread of rainfall events leads to an
increase in total groundwater consumption, with or without energy supply
interruption.
Another interesting question is whether the impact of a change in uncer-
tainty about rainfall is greater when energy supply is intermittent. First,
with Lemmas 1 and 2, it is straightforward to show that a mean-preserving
spread of a rainfall event in a future period s(> t) increases the optimal
amount of irrigation in t when energy supply interruption is present, but has
no effect otherwise. However, one cannot determine whether the impact of
a mean-preserving spread of rainfall in the current period t is greater with
energy supply interruption than otherwise (see Appendix B.5).
As is the case with the expected value of rainfall, it is not possible to de-
termine analytically whether an increase in uncertainty about rainfall events
leads to greater total groundwater consumption with energy supply inter-
ruption than otherwise. This is ultimately determined by the nature of the
crop-water function and is thus an empirical question.
2.6 Numerical Examples
The theoretical analysis above suggests that the impact of energy supply
interruption on total irrigation, the variable of the most interest, is ambigu-
ous. We also found that it is impossible to determine whether changes in
the distribution of rainfall have a greater impact on total irrigation when
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there is energy supply interruption than otherwise. Therefore, it is inter-
esting to see the sign of these effects and their magnitude in a real-world
parameter space. This section describes the calibration method, discusses
the simulation results, and finally derives policy implications.
2.6.1 Calibration
Calibration requires a physical model that relates soil moisture level to crop
growth. This study uses the AquaCrop model calibrated by Foster (2013)
for corn production in the U. S. High Plains. AquaCrop is a crop simulation
model developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization to model crop
production when water is the limiting factor (Steduto et al., 2009; Raes et al.,
2009). It uses soil moisture as the major determinant of crop growth, as in
our study, and has been widely used, calibrated, and verified by researchers
for many agricultural regions with a wide variety of climate conditions and
crop types (e.g., Farahani et al., 2009; Araya et al., 2010; Stricevic et al.,
2011; Garc´ıa-Vila and Fereres, 2012). The crop-water function and state
equation in this study are thus calibrated to the outcomes of the calibrated
AquaCrop model so that the resulting total irrigation ranges within the his-
torically observed levels in the region. The calibrated daily crop-water func-
tion is presented graphically in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.2 shows the fit of yield
predictions using the daily crop-water function calibrated to the AquaCrop-
predicted yield response.
2.6.2 Results
The dynamic optimization problem is solved numerically for the crop-water
function using rainfall events over the past 30 years in Nebraska. Here we
first present the results for 2012, the driest year in the region for the past 30
years. We then look at the results for 1992 (wettest) in order to contrast the
impact of energy supply interruption under two different climate conditions6.
Figure 2.3 shows the contour map of profit per acre with respect to pump-
ing cost and the probability of energy supply interruption for the rainfall
6Results for other years are not presented as they are similar in nature to those for
1992 and 2012.
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pattern of 2012. The profits are calculated based on a corn price of $5 per
bushel and production costs, excluding pumping, of $3 per bushel. As can be
seen in the figure, profitability is highly resilient to energy supply interrup-
tion. This is primarily because the cost of pumping is extremely low relative
to the price of corn. This suggests that relatively small financial incentives
can induce farmers to adopt interruptible energy contracts. As an illustra-
tion, examples of energy contracts shown in Table 2.1 are represented by red
circles in the figure. Agricultural producers are likely to choose interruptible
over non-interruptible contracts, given the steep differential in profits.
Figure 2.4 shows the contour map of total irrigation per acre with respect
to the pumping cost and the probability of energy supply interruption for
2012. Interestingly, it shows that energy supply interruption could indeed
increase the amount of irrigation, ceteris paribus. For example, for a pumping
cost of $2/acre-inch, the total amount of irrigation is greater by about 1.5
inches when the probability of energy outage is 0.35 than when there are no
energy outages. If the energy price is lowered as a compensation for energy
supply interruptibility as in load control programs, for example to $1.5/acre-
inch, total irrigation could see an additional 0.5-inch increase. Therefore,
because producers under interruptible contracts consume more water than
they would under a non-interruptible contract, both the supply interruption
and the price effects work against groundwater conservation.
The magnitude of the supply interruption effect can be substantial, es-
pecially in a dry year, suggesting that energy supply interruption amplifies
the impact of changes in rainfall distribution on total irrigation. In order to
achieve a complementary reduction in groundwater use through an increase
in the energy price, the increment must be quite high because of the highly
price-inelastic demand for water. Such a price increase could face fierce op-
position from agricultural producers.
Figure 2.5 shows the contour map of total irrigation per acre with respect
to the price of water and the probability of energy outages for 1992. Because
1992 was much wetter than 2012, the total amount of irrigation is much
lower. Energy supply interruption still increases the total amount of irriga-
tion, though to a much smaller degree than in 2012. That is, groundwater
irrigation may see a greater increase in a drier year if agricultural producers
are faced with power supply interruption, or vice versa.
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2.6.3 Policy Implications
When assessing the impact of the introduction of direct irrigation load con-
trol, attention should be given to the effect of energy supply interruption
(supply interruption effect) and energy price (price effect). In a realistic pa-
rameter space, energy supply interruption could lead to an increase in total
groundwater consumption, ceteris paribus. Further, lowering the unit price of
energy could further increase the total amount of irrigation. Therefore, both
supply interruption and price effects could hinder groundwater conservation.
The price effect can be mitigated through financially compensating agricul-
tural producers with a lump sum transfer instead of lowering the marginal
energy price; however, the supply interruption effect will persist.
Profit is highly resilient to energy supply interruption for corn production
in the regions studied. This has an important policy implication for setting
energy prices in interruptible energy contracts. Agricultural producers would
choose interruptible contracts even if the price compensation for energy were
less than can actually be seen for Custer PPD. This suggests that the energy
price for interruptible contracts can be increased without affecting agricul-
tural producers’ choice of energy contract. This could lead to a reduction
in groundwater consumption through price effect without decreasing energy
suppliers’ ability to control peak energy load.
When the supply interruption effect on groundwater consumption is posi-
tive, however, there is no incentive-compatible energy contract structure that
would lead to lower water consumption for interruptible contracts. The unit
energy price for interruptible contracts, in fact, needs to be higher than that
for non-interruptible contracts in order to induce lower groundwater con-
sumption. However, in this case, agricultural producers would not opt into
an interruptible contract since it would be financially disadvantageous. In
order to maintain the groundwater consumption level after the introduction
of a load control, the unit energy price for interruptible contracts must be
higher than the original unit energy price. Moreover, the new unit price for
non-interruptible contracts must be set even higher than that for interrupt-
ible contracts, which is likely to be unpopular with producers.
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2.7 Conclusions and Extensions
The ever-increasing and inextricably linked demand for energy and water
warrants informed joint energy-water management. Energy supply inter-
ruption is common in some regions where the economy relies heavily on
groundwater-fed irrigation. Nonetheless, the impact of energy supply inter-
ruption on groundwater consumption has not been studied rigorously in the
economics literature. This study develops economic insights into agricultural
producers’ adaptation to energy supply interruption and its potential conse-
quences on groundwater conservation. We modeled intraseasonal irrigation
decisions by individual agricultural producers with random energy supply
interruption and stochastic rainfall and analyzed them both analytically and
numerically by means of a stochastic dynamic programming approach.
We have shown that agricultural producers increase the amount of irri-
gation per irrigation opportunity in response to interruptibility in energy
supply. This makes good economic sense because this strategy allows agri-
cultural producers to hedge against the risk of not being able to irrigate in
future periods. The impact of energy supply interruption on expected to-
tal groundwater consumption, however, is ambiguous and thus an empirical
question. Numerical examples show that energy supply interruption could
lead to an increase in total groundwater consumption in a realistic parameter
space. This indicates that an energy policy may have unintended impacts on
water resource management due to the direct link between energy and water
use in groundwater-irrigated agriculture.
Rainfall is one of the most significant determinants of irrigation. A de-
crease in the expected value of and a mean-preserving spread of rainfall
always leads to a higher optimal irrigation amount, with or without energy
supply interruption, leading to an increase in total groundwater conservation.
Energy supply interruption interacts with climate in an interesting way to
affect groundwater consumption behavior. When there is no energy supply
interruption, only the distribution of rainfall events in the current period in-
fluences producers’ irrigation decisions. On the other hand, the distribution
of rainfall events in all the future periods affects irrigation decisions in the
current period with a declining degree of influence. Therefore, information
about the distribution of future rainfall events is more valuable when there is
energy supply interruption than otherwise. Moreover, numerical results sug-
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gest that it is possible that the distribution of rainfall events has a greater
impact on total groundwater consumption with energy supply interruption
changes than without.
There are multiple interesting extensions for future work. First, econo-
metric analysis using energy and water consumption data under energy sup-
ply interruption will prove useful to gaining further insights into the sign
and magnitude of the comparative statics results derived analytically in this
study. Econometric analysis on observed data has an advantage over numer-
ical analysis in that no priori assumptions or parametrization of the model
are necessary. Second, aside from the irrigation load control program, an-
other popular way to manage peak energy load is time-of-use rates. Under
this program, since agricultural producers can irrigate whenever they want
but at a higher price during on-peak hours, they are faced with quite a dif-
ferent incentive structure than under irrigation load control. It would be
interesting to examine the implications of time-of-use rates on groundwa-
ter irrigation behavior and then compare them with those of irrigation load
control. Finally, energy supply interruption also occurs in other countries
that depend critically on groundwater for irrigation, but for a different rea-
son than that discussed in this study. Specifically, unintended energy supply
failure due to inappropriate management of facilities is prevalent in develop-
ing countries(Dethier et al., 2011; Steinbuks and Foster, 2010; Adenikinju,
2003; Gulyani, 1999; Perveen et al., 2012). Even though the underlying rea-
son for energy supply interruption is different, farmers in those countries face
exactly the same incentive structure, but unlike US farmers, they cannot opt
out. Therefore, it would be interesting to examine if improving energy sup-
ply consistency in those countries would achieve a significant reduction in
groundwater use for agriculture.
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Price structure of contracts in the Custer Public Power
District (per kwh)
Power Control Type Unit Price in 2007 Unit Price in 2008
No Control $0.0875 $0.1100
1 day Control $0.0490 $0.0565
2 day Control $0.0470 $0.0500
3 day Control $0.0450 $0.0470
Full Control $0.0430 $0.0460
Table 2.2: Control Hours in the Custer Public Power District
Power Contract Type Hours in 2002 (hours) Hours in 2008 (hours)
No Control 0 0
1 day Control 55 20
2 day Control 110 40
3 day Control 170 60
Daily Control 320 100
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.1: Daily Crop-Water Function for Corn
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Figure 2.2: Daily Crop-Water Function for Corn
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Figure 2.3: Contour Map of Expected Profit ($/acre) for 2012 (Dry Year)
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Figure 2.4: Contour Map of Expected Irrigation (inch) for 2012 (Dry
Year)
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Figure 2.5: Contour Map of Expected Total Irrigation (inch) for 1992
(Wet Year)
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Figure 2.6: Changes in Seasonal Irrigation Amounts due to Energy
Supply Interruption of 15%
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Figure 2.7: Changes in Seasonal Irrigation Amounts due to Energy
Supply Interruption of 30%
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CHAPTER 3
UNRAVELING DETERRENCE EFFECTS
OF REGULATORY ACTIVITIES UNDER
THE CLEAN WATER ACT FOR WATER
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
3.1 Introduction
Under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), direct
regulatory activities - inspections and enforcement actions - are the main
tools used to reduce pollutant discharges and thus protect water quality.
Regardless of regulators’ efforts to contain the level of pollutant emissions,
noncompliance by regulated firms remains common. Considering the limited
resources and budgets of regulators, it is very useful for regulators to have
reliable information regarding which regulatory actions are most effective
in improving environmental performance. For this reason, the choice and
effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement strategies has been an active
area of research in environmental economics. In this study, I examine the
deterrence effect of regulatory activities on major1 wastewater treatment
plants in Illinois.
Measuring the deterrence effect of inspection is challenging because of re-
verse causality: emission levels and regulatory actions will be positively cor-
related because higher emission levels attract more regulatory actions. Pre-
vious studies have paid considerable attention to this issue and succeeded
partially in separating out the causal effects of inspections and enforcement
actions (e.g., Deily and Gray, 1991; Gray and Deily, 1996; Laplante and
Rilstone, 1996; Earnhart, 2004a; Keohane et al., 2009). While fixed effect
(FE) estimation effectively avoids reverse causality caused by unobserved in-
dividual specific characteristics, it introduces a different type of endogeneity.
Specifically, strict exogeneity, an assumption necessary for the consistency
of FE estimators, is likely to be violated. In fact, strict exogeneity is an
1A municipal wastewater treatment plant is classified as “major” when its design flows
are greater than one million gallons per day or it contains industrial pretreatment programs
approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or authorized states.
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implausible assumption in the context of environmental regulation, where
regulators and regulated facilities interact with each other dynamically. 2
By means of a testing method suggested in Wooldridge (2010), I show
that strict exogeneity assumptions are indeed violated in the case of water
pollution enforcement data. I tackle this problem utilizing the sequential
exogeneity condition in a generalized method of moments (GMM) estima-
tion to obtain consistent coefficient estimates. Comparison of the estima-
tion results from pooled OLS (POLS), FE, and GMM indicates that not
only POLS but also FE could introduce serious bias. For example, in this
particular application, POLS and FE suggest that non-monetary sanctions
increase emission levels and monetary sanctions have no deterrence effect.
On the contrary, GMM suggests that non-monetary sanctions have no de-
terrence effect, while monetary sanctions do. Therefore, simply applying a
POLS or FE type model can lead to a distorted view of the true deterrence
effect of inspections, which could then lead to misguided decision making on
inspection and enforcement action policies. Policy implications drawn from
more reliable estimation results may lead to more effective management of
pollutant emissions.
Finally, this study also contributes to the existing literature by examin-
ing the deterrence effects of different inspection methods and clarifying the
regional spillover effect of enforcement actions, an important issue in recent
studies (e.g., Shimshack and Ward, 2005a; Langpap and Shimshack, 2010).
3.2 Institutional Background
The NPDES program was created in 1972 under the Clean Water Act (CWA)
to control point-source pollutant discharge into waterbodies in the U.S.3 Un-
der NPDES, all municipal and industrial facilities that discharge pollutants
from any point source are required to obtain a permit that sets a numerical
limit on the eﬄuent discharges of important chemicals and requires the in-
stallation of appropriate abatement technology. Moreover, every permitted
firm must self-report the emission levels of important regulated chemicals
2This point will be further clarified in the literature review and method sections.
3Point source pollution is defined as pollution whose source is identifiable, while non-
point source pollutant is defined as pollution whose source is unidentifiable or prohibitively
expensive to identify.
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monthly4.
An interesting feature of the program is its encouragement of decentralized
regulatory activity. Instead of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) implementing the program all across the United States, the job can
be delegated to states. In fact, states can apply for authorization to take
over the role of the EPA5. The 47 states authorized by EPA have substantial
discretion over how to implement the NPDES permit program, from eﬄuent
limit setting to inspection and enforcement actions. Delegation of the role
to states, however, does not mean the federal EPA will no longer interfere
with the program implementation. The agency still conducts inspections and
takes enforcement actions against regulated plants, but much less frequently
than in unauthorized states.
Regulators use different types of inspections to encourage compliance. Re-
connaissance inspection without sampling (ROS) merely involves visually
checking if the abatement technology is properly used. ROS may be able
to detect operational violations (non-use or improper use of abatement tech-
nology), but it is unable to detect excessive pollution discharges. Helland
(1998) describes ROS as providing a reminder that regulators are watch-
ing. ROS is the least resource-intensive type of inspection and takes several
hours at most. Compliance Evaluation Inspection (CEI) is much more in-
volved than ROS as it involves, among other steps, reviewing the applicable
eﬄuent limits together with records of self-reported eﬄuent discharge as well
as evaluating the abatement technology, laboratories, and receiving waters.
However, it has only slightly greater power to detect violations than does
ROS because it still does not involve independent on-site sampling (Helland,
1998). Inspections accompanied with independent sampling, such as Com-
pliance Sampling Inspection (CSI) or Compliance Biomonitoring Inspection
(CBI), have greater potential to detect violations6. As one would expect,
costs increase from ROS to CEI to CSI.
There are different types of enforcement actions regulators can use to bring
4Some chemicals are required to be reported yearly.
5States can also opt out of applying for authorization. In that case, the federal EPA
is responsible for implementing the program. As of 2011, the EPA had authorized 47
states. States that are not authorized are District of Columbia, Idaho, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, and six U.S. territories.
6See the NPDES Compliance Inspection Manual (http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/resources/publications/monitoring/cwa/inspections/npdesinspect/
npdesinspect.pdf) for different inspection types and more detailed descriptions.
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firms in noncompliance back to compliance. Contrary to the usual theoreti-
cal assumption, a single violation usually does not immediately lead to the
imposition of a fine. Regulators generally start with warning letters and
calls. When regulators do not observe any improvements in the firm’s envi-
ronmental performance, they proceed with formal enforcement actions. The
majority of the formal enforcement actions taken by regulatory agencies con-
sist of administrative compliance orders. Continuation of violation after an
order could lead to the severest and rarest type of formal enforcement ac-
tions, prosecution, which often involves a monetary sanction and installation
of appropriate abatement technology.
3.3 Literature Review
Basic Economic Theory of Environmental Compliance
Becker (1968) presented the basic idea that potential criminals decide whether
to commit a crime or not by weighing the benefit and “expected” cost of
committing the crime. While potential criminals are in the best place to
evaluate their personal benefit from committing a crime, they can only guess
the potential cost imposed by a regulatory agency. Their expected cost of
committing a crime is determined by the perceived probability of criminal
detection, the probability of punishment conditional on detection, and the
size of the punishment. Therefore, regulators can deter a criminal by in-
creasing the expected cost of crime, which can be achieved by increasing the
monitoring effort (higher detection rate), the probability of punishment, and
the size of punishment.
This basic idea translates to polluters’ compliance decisions under the
NPDES permit program. When the probability and size of the fine increase,
dischargers are more likely to comply. Since it’s the perceived probability
and size of the potential fine that affect compliance decisions, even fines im-
posed on other plants could induce dischargers to update their beliefs about
the stringency of regulators upward, leading to a higher rate of compliance.
Therefore, fine imposition could have a deterrence effect on that facility (spe-
cific deterrence) as well as on other facilities (general deterrence).
Harrington (1988) first introduced a dynamic model of environmental en-
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forcement. In his model, firms are faced with differential inspection rates
and penalties depending on their prior history of environmental performance.
This model provides a partial explanation for the fact that a majority of the
regulated facilities were in compliance even though the size of the penalty
was rather small. The study implies that current regulators’ inspection and
enforcement action decisions are a function of prior compliance history.
The role of inspections, however, is critically different under NPDES than
in the models of Becker (1968) and Harrington (1988). While inspections are
the only way of detecting a violation in their models, emission levels are self-
reported monthly by the regulated plants and thus violations are immediately
visible for regulators under NPDES. In such a system, inspections should
play a different role, of checking and inducing truthful reporting, rather than
detecting emission violations (Magat and Viscusi, 1990; Cohen, 1999). Thus,
it should be expected that under the NPDES program, inspections have
limited potential to deter pollution discharges while enforcement actions may
remain effective.
Empirical Evidence and Econometric Issues
Empirical studies on the effectiveness of environmental regulation are numer-
ous, spanning the major environmental statues for water, air, solid waste, and
other laws (Gray and Shimshack, 2011). Even though each has some distinc-
tive features, the basic structures of the regulations are quite similar across
states and thus econometric strategies for analyzing program effectiveness
are also similar. In this section, I review empirical findings under the Clean
Water Act with emphasis on econometric issues.
Magat and Viscusi (1990), using quarterly data on the pulp and paper mill
industry, found evidence of endogeneity as a result of the contemporaneous
reverse causality between emission level and inspection noted above. This
reverse causality could emerge when a current high emission level induces a
contemporaneous inspection. Having found that an instrumental variable ap-
proach still produces a positive coefficient estimate on concurrent inspection,
they decided to include only lagged inspections and found a statistically sig-
nificant deterrence effect. Laplante and Rilstone (1996), who examined the
pulp and paper mill industry in Quebec, overcame the reverse causality prob-
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lem using two-stage estimation. At the first stage, a predicted probability
of inspection in the current period is estimated by probit regression, and
then the predicted probability, instead of actual inspection occurrence sta-
tus, is used as a regressor in a second-stage regression of Biological Oxygen
Demand (BOD) level7. They found that the threat of concurrent inspection
has a statistically significant deterrence effect. The two-stage procedure has
been used in many subsequent studies to capture dischargers’ perceptions
about the probability of being inspected (e.g., Deily and Gray, 1991; Gray
and Deily, 1996; Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; Earnhart, 2004b; Earnhart,
2004a; Keohane et al., 2009). The key assumption is that regulated plants
carefully observe regulators’ inspection strategy and are able to estimate the
probability of inspection just as the first-stage probit analysis predicts. If
these rather strong assumptions fail, second-stage estimation can be biased.
Importantly, Magat and Viscusi (1990), Laplante and Rilstone (1996), and
Helland (1998) were unable to examine the deterrence effect of enforcement
actions because of the lack of reliable data at that time. Therefore, the in-
spection variable could have picked up the deterrence effect of enforcement
actions, which led to overestimation of the pure deterrence effect of inspection
itself because the two are likely to be positively correlated with each other.
Earnhart (2004b) introduced enforcement actions along with inspection and
examined their deterrence effects on the BOD discharges of wastewater treat-
ment plants in Kansas. The study found that both EPA-led and state-led
enforcement actions have both specific and general deterrence effects, and
that the threat of inspection measured by predicted inspection probability
also has a deterrence effect.
While all these studies make use of panel data, they use only the POLS es-
timation method. POLS may cause biased coefficient estimates for a reason
different from the contemporaneous endogeneity problem mentioned above.
If only cross-sectional data were available, then one would expect to observe a
positive correlation between the number of violations and inspections because
firms that are more likely to be in noncompliance attract more inspections
and enforcement actions. This cross-sectional positive correlation implies
7BOD measures the amount of dissolved oxygen microorganisms consume to disinte-
grate organic materials in water. A high BOD level indicates a high concentration of
organic materials, which could lead to algae bloom. The decaying process of dead algae
consumes dissolved oxygen in water and cause oxygen deprivation, which could lead to
devastating mass mortality of marine life.
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that the true deterrence effect of inspection and enforcement actions could
be underestimated when an estimation method that exploits cross-sectional
variation, such as POLS, is used. Shimshack and Ward (2008) applied quan-
tile regression to a pooled sample of pulp and paper mills in the United
States and found that firms whose emission levels are well below the limit
still respond to the fines imposed on other firms (general deterrence). On
the other hand, they also found that the total number of inspections in the
same state for the past year has a statistically significant positive effect on
the BOD level at the 25 and 50% quantiles and on Total Suspended Solids8
(TSS) at the 50, 75 and 90% quantiles. This finding might be attributable to
cross-sectional (across states) reverse causality. A perverse effect of regula-
tory action can also be seen in Earnhart (2004b), who used POLS and found
that EPA enforcement actions have a positive impact on BOD emissions.
fixed effects (FE) estimation could alleviate this cross-sectional reverse
causality problem by eliminating cross-sectional variation and looking solely
at time variation. Shimshack and Ward (2005a) employed Chamberlain’s
conditional random effect probit (CRE) model on BOD and TSS compliance
data for pulp and paper mills nationwide. CRE estimation allows unobserved
individual effects to be correlated with explanatory variables and also allows
time variation, but not cross-sectional variation, to be harnessed for param-
eter identification 9. They found that a fine imposed on a facility within a
year had a statistically significant deterrence effect on other facilities within
the same state (general deterrence). It also found that inspections within
the preceding12 months had a deterrence effect (specific deterrence).
Earnhart (2004a), using the same data set as in Earnhart (2004b), ex-
plored three different estimation methods: pooled OLS, Random Effects,
and fixed effects models. Interestingly, while the coefficients on the number
of fines within the preceding 12 months and the concurrent predicted proba-
bility of inspection are negative in the POLS regression, as economic theory
would predict, their counterparts in FE are positive and statistically signif-
icant. This is somewhat puzzling because if cross-sectional reverse causality
8One of the measures of water quality, representing the amount of particulate dissolved
in water.
9CRE starts with the assumption that unobserved individual effects are normally dis-
tributed conditional on the individual mean of the explanatory variables over time. Once
this assumption is maintained, one can proceed with probit model estimation where un-
observed individual effects are replaced by the average values of explanatory variables.
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is a real threat to consistent estimation, it is the pooled OLS estimates that
should be biased upward, not FE. Earnhart attributed this phenomenon to
FE’s inability to estimate time-invariant facility characteristics, such as flow
capacity. However, time-invariant characteristics are in fact “controlled for”
in FE through elimination with within-transformation10. The unexpected
direction of bias might instead be attributable to the violation of strict exo-
geneity that is required for consistent estimation using FE. Strict exogeneity
can be mathematically expressed as follows:
E[ui,t|Xi,1, Xi,2, . . . , Xi,T ] = 0 ∀t (3.1)
where ui,t represents idiosyncratic error and Xi,t are vectors of explanatory
variables at time t: Idiosyncratic error at time t is uncorrelated with past,
present, and future explanatory variables. This assumption is likely to be
violated in the context of environmental regulation, where dynamic interac-
tions between regulators and regulated facilities take place. Because current
inspection decisions are based on the past environmental performance of the
regulated facility, the current regulatory decisions are likely to be a function
of shocks in past emission levels, thus violating the strict exogeneity assump-
tion. For example, a positive shock in the emission level at time t might
lead to a higher probability of regulators’ actions in the future. The mag-
nitude of the bias might be large enough that the coefficients on regulators’
actions are positive, as in Earnhart (2004a). Chamberlain’s conditional ran-
dom effects probit model used in Shimshack and Ward (2005a) also assumes
strict exogeneity of the distribution of outcomes yit conditional on covariates
and unobserved individual effects. This assumption will be violated if future
values of covariates are a function of idiosyncratic error in the previous out-
comes, which is the case in the context of dynamic regulator-firm interaction.
Therefore, it is possible that estimated coefficients are biased as well.
This study, using data on the environmental performance of major wastew-
ater treatment plants in Illinois, will address the aforementioned econometric
issue using a GMM estimation method utilizing the sequential exogeneity
condition in order to understand the impact of endogeneity on the coeffi-
10Within-transformation transforms a variable xi,t to xi,t−
T∑
s=1
xi,s. Any time-invariant
variable will be canceled out by this transformation.
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cient estimates and obtain more reliable estimates from which correct policy
implications can be drawn.
3.4 The Model
Let i, j, and t denote a facility, the jurisdiction to which facility i belongs to,
and time, respectively. The estimating equation may be rewritten as follows:
yi,t =α0 + α1yi,t−1 + CRi,tδ1 + LRi,tδ2 + JRj,tδ3
+Xi,tγ1 +MDγ2 + Y Dγ3 + ci + vi,t (3.2)
, where
CRi,t =
[
ROSi,t; CEIi,t; SAMi,t; NMEi,t; FINEi,t
]
LRi,t =
[ 12∑
s=1
ROSi,t−s;
12∑
s=1
CEIi,t−s;
12∑
s=1
SAMi,t−s;
12∑
s=1
NMEi,t−s;
12∑
s=1
FINEi,t−s
]
JRj,t =
[ 15∑
s=4
NMEj,t−s;
15∑
s=4
FINEj,t−s;
15∑
s=4
NMEj−,t−s;
15∑
s=4
FINEj−,t−s
]
Following Earnhart (2004b) and Shimshack and Ward (2008), the depen-
dent variable yi,t is the current TSS concentration ratio. The dependent
variable takes a value in the interval (0, 1] when in compliance and takes
a value greater than one when TSS concentration level is over the permit-
ted limit. The variables ci and vi,t represent an unobserved time-invariant
individual effect and an idiosyncratic error term.
As pointed out by Gray and Shimshack (2011), when there is some iner-
tia or persistence in the emission level, the current emission level could be
closely correlated with lagged enforcement actions that are a function of the
past emission level. Therefore, in this study, I will include the once-lagged
emission level in the structural equation to avoid omitted variable bias11.
The main interest of this study is to measure the deterrence effects of dif-
11It is confirmed that twice-lagged dependent variables have no explanatory power after
controlling for other covariates.
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ferent types of inspections and enforcement actions and to understand the
impact of endogeneity on the measurement. Inspections are classified into
three groups: (1) reconnaissance inspection without sampling (ROS), (2)
comprehensive inspection without sampling (CEI), and (3) inspection with
sampling (SAM). Each inspection type enters into the model in two forms:
(1) concurrent inspection on facility i and (2) the number of inspections for
the past year on i to measure the deterrence effect of constant threat from
the presence of inspections. Following Shimshack and Ward (2005b), enforce-
ment actions are grouped into two types: non-monetary enforcement actions
(informal enforcement actions and the majority of the formal enforcement ac-
tions), represented as NME, and monetary sanctions, represented as FINE.
As can be seen from the equation, each enforcement action type enters into
the model exactly the same way as inspections. In order to measure the
general deterrence effects of non-monetary and monetary sanctions, several
variations are entered into the model. First, the number of enforcement ac-
tions for the past 4-15 months on “other” facilities in the “same” jurisdiction
is included (NMEj,t−s, FINEj,t−s). Second, the number of enforcement ac-
tions for the past 4-15 months on “other” facilities in “other” jurisdictions
is included (NMEj−,t−s, FINEj−,t−s). The empirical question I would like
to answer from the latter covariates is whether the general deterrence effects
of enforcement actions penetrate across jurisdictions: if regulated plants are
responsive to enforcement actions exerted by the regulators in other jurisdic-
tions. The lag reflects delays in recognizing the trend of regulatory activities
on “other” plants.
Aside from the variables of main interest listed above, I include monthly
average temperature and rainfall. This is because removing TSS involves
aerobic digestion using microorganisms, the efficiency of which is affected
by weather conditions. Local socio-demographic variables, such as income
and unemployment rates, have been shown to influence environmental per-
formance in previous studies (e.g., Deily and Gray, 1991) and are represented
collectively by Xi,t in the equation above.
Finally, monthly dummies (MD) are included in the equation to capture
seasonality. Yearly dummies (YD) are also included to capture overall ten-
dencies across the state.
67
3.5 Data
To test the significance of endogeneity in the estimation of enforcement
effects, this study uses data on the environmental performance of major
wastewater treatment plants in Illinois. Non-major facilities are not required
to self-report their emissions levels, nor are the permitting authorities re-
quired to enter the relevant data into the Integrated Compliance Information
System-NPDES (ICIS-NPDES) for those facilities, so the data for non-major
facilities are incomplete. Nonetheless, the focus on majors is not too restric-
tive because much greater regulatory efforts are exerted on major facilities
than on non-majors in light of major facilities’ high potential for causing
environmental damage. The focus is on wastewater treatment plants be-
cause they are the dominant type of major facility in Illinois: 209 out of
275 major facilities. Mixing multiple industries is not desirable because the
data generating process could be considerably different across industries. To
the author’s knowledge, all of the empirical studies on environmental com-
pliance focused on a single industry: Deily and Gray (1991) and Gray and
Deily (1996) on the steel industry; Magat and Viscusi (1990), Laplante and
Rilstone (1996), and Shimshack and Ward (2005a) and Shimshack and Ward
(2008) on the pulp and paper mill industry; and Helland (1998), Earnhart
(2004b), and Langpap and Shimshack (2010) on wastewater treatment plants.
More particularly, we focus on a particular type of environmental mea-
sure for wastewater treatment plants, their Total Suspended Solids (TSS)
concentration levels. A high TSS concentration leads to an increase in the
temperature of receiving waters, causing less dissolved oxygen. As a conse-
quence, aquatic organisms that are sensitive to the level of dissolved oxygen
are disturbed. TSS also interrupts the hatching of fish eggs by covering the
stream bed.
The main sources of data are EPA’s Permit Compliance System (PCS)
and ICIS-NPDES; EPA is currently transferring data from PCS into ICIS-
NPDES. Even though EPA maintains and runs the two databases, permitting
authorities are mostly responsible for data entry. EPA requires permitting
authorities to enter the emission level of the regulated chemicals that are
self-reported monthly by the regulated facilities, along with inspections and
enforcement actions regulators have taken against the regulated facilities.
From the databases, I obtained (1) monthly TSS discharge and limits,
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(2) an inspections and enforcement actions history with types differentiated,
(3) violations detected by inspections. The resulting data set has a panel
structure, where the cross-sectional unit is an individual major wastewater
treatment plant in Illinois and each plant is observed monthly for the period
2000-2008.
County-level local community characteristics were obtained from Ameri-
can Census 2000 and American Community Survey. Raw weather data for
weather stations in and outside Illinois were obtained from the National
Climatic Data Center, and were then spatially interpolated to approximate
weather conditions at each facility.
3.5.1 Summary statistics
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of the data. First, TSS ratio repre-
sents the TSS concentration of discharges relative to the limit. The TSS ratio
takes a value of more than one when the TSS concentration level exceeds the
limit. According to the summary statistics, the mean TSS ratio is merely
0.35, which is well below 1.0. This is consistent with previous studies on
wastewater treatment plants (e.g., Earnhart, 2004b; Earnhart, 2004a; Lang-
pap and Shimshack, 2010). The maximum level of TSS ratio is about 12,
meaning that the concentration level of TSS is 12 times the limit. Eighty-two
wastewater treatment plants violated the TSS limit at least once during the
sampling period.
On average, plants have ROS inspections during as many as 6 months
within a year , while CEI occurs less than once a year. Some firms even
had an ROS every month, as the maximum number of ROS indicates. Sam-
pling inspections are even less common events than CEI, occurring merely
once in four years on average. This inspection pattern is somewhat par-
ticular to Illinois. While most states almost exclusively use comprehensive
inspections, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania extensively employ recon-
naissance inspections along with comprehensive inspections. In Illinois, re-
connaissance inspections are much more common than comprehensive in-
spections and comprise as much as 80% of all inspections: 13,000 instances
compared to 2000 instances of Compliance Evaluation Inspection (CEI) from
2,000 to 2010.
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Forty of the 82 wastewater treatment plants in noncompliance received at
least one non-monetary sanction in the sampling period. On the other hand,
only three plants were fined in that time.
3.6 Method: Econometrics
3.6.1 Identification of the Potential Sources of Endogeneity
In this section, the sources of potential endogeneity are identified in both
POLS and FE, by far the dominant estimation strategy in empirical envi-
ronmental regulation studies. Recalling the estimating equation:
yi,t =α0 + α1yi,t−1 + CRi,tδ1 + LRi,tδ2 + JRj,tδ3
+Xi,tγ1 +MDγ2 + Y Dγ3 + ci + vi,t (3.3)
First, it can be argued that contemporaneous endogeneity, correlation be-
tween CRi,t and vi.t, seems unlikely to be much of a threat to consistent
estimation under the NPDES permit program. This is because, as Earnhart
(2004b) noted, regulators are unlikely to be aware of current performance
because regulators depend on reports filed by the regulated facility following
the current period. Even though Magat and Viscusi (1990) found evidence of
endogeneity of current inspection, it is probably because they used quarterly
data, in which case regulators may have enough time to respond based on
monthly reports. Laplante and Rilstone (1996) also found an evidence of
endogeneity even for monthly data. However, they were not able to include
enforcement actions because of the lack of the relevant data. Omitted vari-
able bias seems like a more likely cause than simultaneous determination of
emission levels and inspection decisions.
The once-lagged dependent variable yi,t−1 is also a source of bias in both
pooled OLS and fixed effects estimations. In pooled OLS, yi,t−1 are necessar-
ily correlated with the unobserved time-invariant individual term ci, leading
to a positive bias in the coefficient estimate on yi,t−1. On the other hand,
for fixed effects, within-transformation generates yi,t−1 −
T∑
s=2
yi,s−1/(T − 1)
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and vi,t −
T∑
s=2
vi,s/(T − 1) that are necessarily correlated with each other as
a consequence of a necessary violation of the strict exogeneity assumption:
that is, yi,t−1 is correlated with vi,t−1. Nerlove (1971) conducted Monte Carlo
simulations on the following simple model:
yi,t = αyi,t−1 + ci + vt + ui,t (3.4)
where ci is an unobserved individual effect, vt is the time specific effect,
and ui,t is idiosyncratic error that has no serial correlation. Nerlove showed
that FE estimation of α is indeed inconsistent and α is negatively biased.
Nickell (1981) derived an analytical expression for the bias. Some past studies
included lagged dependent variables, but none of them included effective
solutions to this problem12. Even though the coefficient estimate on yi,t−1
itself is not of particular interest, bias in it introduces biases in the coefficient
estimates on other covariates of interest, the magnitude of bias depending
on how strongly they are correlated with yi,t−1. For this reason, this issue
should not be ignored.
The most worrying of all the sources of bias is the endogeneity of direct reg-
ulatory action covariates. In POLS, the correlation between direct regulatory
actions ( CRi,t and LRi,t) and the composite error term ui,t (= ci+vit) seems
likely to be nonzero. This is because regulatory actions are a function of past
environmental performance, which in turn is a function of ci. For example,
regulators are expected to exert more regulatory actions on plants that emit
inherently more pollution than others because of unobserved individual char-
acteristics ci. This might be termed cross-sectional reverse causality because
this endogeneity is an issue when cross-sectional variation is harnessed for
parameter identification. Note that this is different from the contemporane-
ous endogeneity handled in previous studies (e.g., Magat and Viscusi, 1990;
Laplante and Rilstone, 1996). This cross-sectional reverse causality can be
mitigated by FE since the within-transformation eliminates a source of en-
dogeneity, ci. FE, however, instead could introduce another complication
for consistent estimation. Both inspections and enforcement actions are a
function of the past environmental performance. Therefore, shocks in the
12For example, Magat and Viscusi (1990) included a 1-year lagged dependent variable
as a covariate. Earnhart (2004b) included a logged value of average emission level for the
past year.
71
past emission level are most likely correlated with future inspection and en-
forcement actions. For these reasons, the strict exogeneity assumption, a
necessary condition for consistent estimation using FE, is quite likely to be
violated. In this particular application, CRi,t and LRi,t are likely to violate
the strict exogeneity assumption. For example, within transformed CRi,t,
CRi,t −
T∑
s=1
CRi,t/T are likely to be correlated with vi,t −
T∑
s=1
vi,t/T . Nickell
(1981) showed that the order of bias in α for FE is O(1/T) in model (3.4).
That is, as t gets larger, the bias becomes negligible. In this study, the data
span a fairly large period, about 70 on average13. However, as in Nickell
(1981), while yi,t−1 is hypothesized to be correlated only with ui,t−1 but not
with further-lagged error terms, CRi,t is expected to also be correlated with
far deeper lags of the error term because regulators base their decisions not
only on the performance of the immediate past but also on the history of
performance. Therefore, biases on regulatory activities are likely to be far
more persistent than the bias of the coefficient on yi,t−1 in FE.
The coefficient on JRi,t will probably not violate the strict exogeneity
assumption because non-monetary sanctions and fines on “other” facilities
are unlikely to be correlated with the errors of individual i.
3.6.2 Estimation Strategy
As discussed above, both POLS and FE could produce biased estimates, but
for different reasons. Now, I tackle the procedures required to obtain unbi-
ased estimates. Specifically, I use GMM estimation utilizing the sequential
exogeneity condition of independent variables as first suggested in Ander-
son and Hsiao (1981) and later in Arellano and Bond (1991) among others.
Mathematically put, the sequential exogeneity assumption can be written as
follows:
E[vi,t|Xi,1, Xi,2, . . . , Xi,t] = 0 ∀t (3.5)
Unlike equation 3.1, the expression(s) does not assume that the error is not
correlated with future independent variables: past and current explanatory
variables are not correlated with the current idiosyncratic error term. The
so-called Arellano-Bond type GMM starts with taking the first difference of
13The data is unbalanced.
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the structural equation 3.2 in order to eliminate any time-invariant individual
specific effect.
∆yi,t =α1∆yi,t−1 + ∆CRi,tδ1 + ∆LRi,tδ2 + ∆JRj,tδ3
+ ∆Xi,tγ1 + ∆MDtγ2 + ∆Y Dtγ3 + ∆vi,t (3.6)
where ∆qi,t represents the first difference qi,t − qi,t−1. The important terms
in the equation are ∆yi,t−1, ∆CRi,t, and ∆LRi,t. First, ∆yi,t−1 is necessarily
correlated with ∆vi,t. One option to fix this is to employ Arellano-Bond type
moment conditions:
N∑
i=1
(vi,t − vi,t−1) · yi,t−s = 0 t = 3, 4 . . . , T s = 2, 3, . . . , T − 1 (3.7)
However, because the data set is large, it creates explosive numbers of mo-
ment conditions. Even s=2 creates more than 90 moment conditions. Having
too many moment conditions can be problematic. First of all, a proliferation
of moment conditions leads to substantial bias in the coefficient estimate,
especially when identification is weak (Altonji and Segal, 1996; Blundell
and Bond, 1998). Second, even when moment conditions are not weakly
identified, a large number of moment conditions leads to underestimation of
standard errors of the coefficient estimates and also to under-rejection of the
Hansen test for over-identification (Bowsher, 2002; Newey and Windmeijer,
2009). This has to do with the increasing difficulty in estimating the optimal
weight matrix for two-step GMM as the number of moment conditions in-
creases (Koenker and Machado, 1999). For these reasons, the following form
of moment conditions is more desirable:
T∑
t=2
N∑
i=1
(vi,t − vi,t−1) · yi,t−s = 0 s = 2, 3, . . . , T − 1 (3.8)
Note that this moment condition is no stronger than (3.7) since it is clearly
a sufficient condition for (3.8). This type of moment condition is equivalent
to using yi,t−s as instruments for yi,t−1, except the missing values created by
differencing are replaced by 0, as suggested by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). At
the estimation stage, I limit the depth of lags in order to further restrict the
number of moment conditions and to avoid weak identification because overly
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deep lags should not have much additional information. Roodman (2009),
by means of Monte Carlo simulation, showed that restricting the number of
moment conditions in this way could reduce the magnitude of bias in the
coefficient estimate and also result in a much more reliable Hansen test of
over-identification.
Under the sequential exogeneity assumption, ∆CRi,t is endogenous if CRi,t
is correlated with vi,t−1. Under this circumstance, ∆CRi,t needs to be in-
strumented. As long as the sequential exogeneity assumption is valid, the
following moment conditions are available:
T∑
t=2
N∑
i=1
(vi,t − vi,t−1) · CRi,t−s = 0 s = 1, 2 . . . , T − 1 (3.9)
However, it is possible that CRi,t and vi,t−1 are indeed uncorrelated. This
would happen if regulators responded to the performance of firm i with a
lag greater than one. How swiftly regulators react, however, is an empirical
question.
Finally, under the sequential exogeneity assumption, ∆LRi,t is uncorre-
lated with ∆vi,t. This is because the summation of lagged regulatory activ-
ities starts from t − 1, not t. Therefore, I do not instrument them. This
is in stark contrast with FE, where within-transformation causes the trans-
formed error terms to contain deeper-lagged error terms, thus making all the
independent variables of direct regulatory activities endogenous.
3.6.3 Final Specification of GMM
First of all, covariates other than ∆yi,t−1 and ∆CRi,t are instrumented by
themselves. For yi,t−1, I use the following moment conditions for identifica-
tion:
T∑
t=2
N∑
i=1
(vi,t − vi,t−1) · yi,t−3 = 0 (3.10)
T∑
t=2
N∑
i=1
(vi,t − vi,t−1) ·Mean Temperaturei,t−1 = 0 (3.11)
I do not use yi,t−2 as an instrument because the Arellano-Bond test of au-
tocorrelation indicates that vi,t and vi,t−1 are correlated but vi,t and vi,,t−2
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are not, as can be seen in the bottom of Table 3.2. Using yi,t−2 addition-
ally as an instrument produces very similar results except for the slightly
downward-biased estimate of the coefficient on yi,t−1. This implies that the
magnitude of the serial correlation might be so small as not to influence the
estimation results substantially. However, for safety, yi,t−2 is not used as an
instrument. Mean temperature at time t−1 is most likely a valid instrument
since it’s an uncontrollable event. Finally, I chose not to instrument CRi,t
because they are unlikely to be endogenous, judging from the Hansen test for
over-identification reported in Table 3.2. Instrumenting covariates that are
not endogenous merely makes the estimation less efficient14. The exogeneity
of CRi,t implies that regulators react slowly to the performance of regulated
facilities. This of course does not rule out the possibility that FE is biased.
This is because within-transformation relates all the history of regulatory
actions and error terms while FD transformation relates regulatory activities
to the error term of the immediate past. This point and the robustness of
the two-step GMM estimation results are further discussed later.
3.7 Results and Discussion
3.7.1 Comparison of the Estimation Results
The estimation results of pooled OLS and fixed effects are presented along
with the results of the two-step GMM in order to illustrate the differences.
Table 3.2 reports all the estimation results15. First, in the pooled OLS results,
most of the coefficient estimates are positive, as opposed to what economic
theory would predict. In particular, the number of non-monetary sanctions in
the past year has a statistically significant positive effect on the TSS emission
level. These results suggest that the pooled OLS estimates are biased upward.
The fixed effects model appears to offer marginal improvement. For most of
the variables, the coefficients are slightly less positive or “more negative”
than those in pooled OLS. This implies that the fixed effects model might
have mitigated some biases from cross-sectional reverse causality. However,
14Instrumenting CRi,t with CRi,t−1 does render the estimation less efficient, but the
qualitative results remain the same.
15For the sake of space, coefficient estimates on covariates other than yi,t−1 and regula-
tory activities are omitted from the table.
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the number of non-monetary sanctions in the past year is still positive and
statistically significant.
Comparing the estimation results of GMM to POLS and FE, first, most
of the coefficient estimates are more negative than those of POLS and FE.
For some, the difference is substantial. The number of monetary sanctions
in the past year is negative and now statistically significant, while it is pos-
itive in POLS and marginally negative in FE, both insignificant. Moreover,
the number of non-monetary sanctions within the preceding 12 months is
negative and statistically insignificant, while it is positive and statistically
significant in POLS and FE. These results imply that POLS and FE might
have underestimated the true effect. Note that many studies found negative
and statistically significant effects of monetary sanctions even with POLS
and FE; however, they might have substantially underestimated their true
effect.
The general conclusion is that both POLS and FE could cause substantial
biases in the coefficient estimates of regulatory activities, and sometimes the
biases could be large enough that the policy implications drawn from them
could be misleading. For example, for this particular study, both POLS and
FE results imply that non-monetary sanctions increase emission levels rather
than reduce them and that monetary sanctions have no effect.
It is worth noting that the types of biases from using POLS and FE iden-
tified in this study are by no means limited to the Clean Water Act. They
are of significant concern to empirical analysts in any regulatory framework
where two agents (regulators and regulated agents) interact with each other
dynamically, affecting each other’s decision making over time. Examples for
such environmental statutes include the Clean Air Act (e.g., Gray and Deily,
1996; Gray and Shadbegian, 2005) and the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (e.g., Stafford, 2002). Another regulatory regime that has been
given considerable attention is the effectiveness of inspections by the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (e.g., Gray and Jones, 1991; Gray
and Mendeloff, 2005).
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3.7.2 Policy Implications
Inspection
As Table 3.2 suggests, the number of sampling inspections within the pre-
ceding 12 months is statistically significant at the 10% level. On the other
hand, non-sampling inspections, ROS and CEI, seem to have failed to pro-
vide enough of a threat to polluters to induce a response. Considering that
sampling inspection is the most stringent and revealing of all the inspection
types, these results make economic sense. However, sampling inspections are
very expensive both in terms of money and human resources, considerably
more so than ROS and CEI (Helland, 1998). Yet the deterrence effect seems
to be marginal (even though it is statistically significant), its magnitude be-
ing merely about 1.5% of the permitted level. Regulators thus need to weigh
its cost against its effect. ROS, an inspection type extensively used in Illi-
nois, turned out to have no statistically significant deterrence effect. Even
though frequent ROS may indicate “presence of regulatory activity” as Hel-
land (1998) put it, the regulatory tiger appears to be toothless. Considering
the amount of effort regulators have put into this type of inspection, this re-
sult is rather disappointing. It is true that inspections have other roles, such
as checking the accuracy of reporting and gathering information for future
prosecution among others. However, ROS is very limited in those aspects
as well because ROS involves simply a quick visual inspection of a facility.
Therefore, it might be sensible for regulators to reallocate their resources
from ROS to sampling inspections.
Regulated plants’ unresponsiveness to inspections is not surprising. Unlike
other statutes where inspection is the only means of revealing the perfor-
mance of the regulated agents (for example, OSHA), all the agents regulated
under the Clean Water Act self-report their emission levels and are under
continuous pressure of consistency checks for the validity of their reports.
Therefore, inspections are unlikely to add to threats that would reduce pol-
lution discharge.
77
Sanctions
Non-monetary sanctions appear to have no statistically significant deterrence
effect on TSS emitters, which is surprising. Regulators generally use non-
monetary sanctions in response to violations before they impose fines. There-
fore, non-monetary sanctions could signal a future monetary sanction if the
polluters remain in noncompliance. Therefore, once a non-monetary sanc-
tion is imposed, the polluter has an incentive to bring down its emission level
to avoid future monetary sanctions. Nevertheless, the estimation results do
not support this hypothesis. Monetary sanctions, on the other hand, have a
statistically significant specific deterrence effect. Plants that have been fined
within the past year emit on average about 0.1 ratio points less than other-
wise. A fine imposition on “other” plants in the “same” jurisdiction also has
a statistically significant deterrence effect. This deterrence effect is called
the general deterrence effect and is consistent with the findings of Shimshack
and Ward (2005a). Interestingly, however, in this study the magnitude of the
deterrence effect of direct fine imposition (specific deterrence) is much larger
than that of indirect deterrence through the regulator’s reputation building
(general deterrence effect) in our study, whereas the general deterrence ef-
fect is much larger than the specific one in Shimshack and Ward (2005a).
The difference in the relative magnitude might arise because Shimshack and
Ward (2005a) underestimate the true effect of the specific deterrence effect.
Another possibility is that there are differences in the dischargers in each
study. This study looks at wastewater treatment plants that are publicly
owned and whose primary objective is not to make profit. On the other
hand, Shimshack and Ward (2005a) look at pulp and paper companies that
seek to maximize their profits. It is likely that wastewater treatment plants
are not as keen to observe what regulators in their jurisdiction have done to
other firms as are profit-seeking companies. Nonetheless, the impact of the
general deterrence effect is non-negligible. For example, suppose that among
seven plants in a jurisdiction, one of them is fined. Based on our results,
the reduction in emissions from general deterrence is −0.133 (7 × −0.019)
ratio point, which is equivalent in scale to the emission reduction in the fined
plant, −0.129. One can expect a greater reduction in emissions from the
general deterrence effect when there are more firms in the same jurisdiction.
On the other hand, neither non-monetary nor monetary sanctions on “other”
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firms in “other” jurisdictions are statistically significant. This indicates that
the general deterrence effect is contained within the jurisdiction where fine
imposition takes place and does not penetrate across jurisdictions.
3.8 Robustness of the GMM Estimation and a Test for
the Strict Exogeneity Assumption
In GMM estimation, it is crucial to select moment conditions carefully so that
the identification is not weak and they are valid. It has been increasingly
recognized that weak identification leads to seriously biased estimates16. In
order to see if weak identification is a serious concern in this particular ap-
plication, the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator
can be used as a reference point for GMM estimation (Angrist and Pischke,
2008). LIML is known to be robust to weak identification even though it is
not efficient when the variance covariance matrix is not an identity matrix
(Anderson et al., 2011). Thus, large differences in the estimates signal a
weak identification problem. As shown in Table 3.4, estimation results of
GMM and LIML are very similar. This indicates that weak identification
is unlikely to be a serious issue in two-step GMM estimation. GMM was
chosen over LIML for efficiency. Even without heteroscedasticity or serial
correlation, first difference transformation creates a particular form of the
variance covariance matrix of the errors as shown in Roodman (2009), which
renders LIML comparatively less efficient.
Second, satisfaction of all the moment conditions is crucial for consistent
estimation. In order to keep the Hansen test as valid as possible, careful
attention was paid not to use too many moment conditions. To verify that
the Hansen test has some level of validity to detect the violation of moment
conditions, the following moment condition was added:
T∑
t=2
N∑
i=1
(vi,t − vi,t−1) · yi,t−1 = 0 (3.12)
This condition is bound to fail since yi,t−1 is a function of vi,t−1. If the
16see the 1996 special issue of the Journal of Business and Economic Statistics on GMM
estimation.
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Hansen test cannot reject the null hypothesis, one can never expect that it
will detect more subtle over-identification problems. Fortunately, the p-value
of the Hansen test is 0.000. Of course, this merely indicates that the Hansen
test bears at least a minimal level of validity to detect violations of moment
conditions. The final specification passed a minimal test for its validity, as
can be seen from the Hansen test shown at the bottom of Table 3.2.
As previously mentioned, I did not instrument for CRi,t but used the
following moment condition assumption for the GMM estimation:
T∑
t=2
N∑
i=1
(vi,t − vi,t−1) · (CRi,t − CRi,t−1) = 0 (3.13)
The Hansen test suggests this moment condition is indeed not violated, which
implies CRi,t and vi,t−1 are uncorrelated. This casts some doubt on my claim
that CRi,t violates the strict exogeneity assumption. Therefore, I checked
if the violation of strict exogeneity is indeed present following the testing
method suggested in Wooldridge (2010). The test is done by adding the
forwarded covariates suspected of violating the strict exogeneity assumption
in the original fixed effects model and then checking if their coefficients are
individually statistically significant. If those covariates do not violate the as-
sumption, they should not have any explanatory power. Here, the suspected
covariates are CRi,t and LRi,t and the test involves adding variables equal
to the sum of each of these for the coming 12 months. Table 3.3 shows the
FE estimation results with the additional forwarded covariates. The pres-
ence of a fine in the past year, a contemporaneous non-monetary sanction,
and non-monetary sanctions in the past year are all statistically significant.
Thus, I conclude that the strict exogeneity assumption regarding these vari-
ables is indeed violated. Further, these tests also suggest that biases for
these variables from FE may be particularly severe. In fact, the most im-
portant changes in the coefficient estimates on non-monetary and monetary
sanctions in the past year are apparent in comparing the FE and GMM esti-
mates. Another interesting discovery is that none of the inspection covariates
is statistically significant in Table 3.3. This suggests that regulators are more
responsive to facility performance when making enforcement decisions than
for inspections.
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3.9 Concluding Remarks
The main contribution of this study lies in the advancements of methods
of empirically eliciting the deterrence effects of environmental regulatory ac-
tions. In particular, potential sources of endogeneity in POLS and FE are
identified and then tackled by means of GMM utilizing sequential exogene-
ity assumptions. Comparing estimation results from POLS and FE with
GMM indicates that previous studies that used either POLS or FE might
have underestimated the true impact of regulatory activities on environmen-
tal performance. The types of biases from using POLS and FE identified in
this study are of significant concern to empirical analysts in any regulatory
framework where two agents (regulators and regulated agents) interact with
each other dynamically, affecting each other’s decision making over time. Re-
evaluating the effectiveness of inspections and enforcement actions in CAA,
RCRA, and OSHA may lead to different conclusions than those in previous
studies. I believe that the endogeneity issues can significantly bias the con-
clusions and need to be properly addressed in order to provide an accurate
analysis on the effectiveness of regulatory activities.
In this study, I also empirically examine the effectiveness of regulatory ac-
tions on a type of environmental performance (TSS) of wastewater treatment
plants in Illinois. ROS, to which Illinois, unlike other states, has allocated
considerable resources and time, has no deterrence effect. The effect of sam-
pling inspections is statistically significant, but the magnitude of their impact
is fairly small. I also found that the relative magnitude of the general deter-
rence effect compared to the specific one is smaller in wastewater treatment
plants than in the pulp and paper industry. Still, the magnitude of gen-
eral deterrence effect in wastewater treatment plants is non-negligible. This
supports Shimshack and Ward (2005a)’s claim that substantially more im-
provement in environmental performance can be achieved by imposing fines
than previously thought. Considering the significance of the general deter-
rence effect, it seems important to understand its mechanism and impact in
different settings. My findings contribute to this broader question, since the
general deterrence effect is found to be contained in the same jurisdiction
but does not penetrate across jurisdictions.
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3.10 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
variable mean sd min max
TSS ratio 0.35 0.31 0 12.17
ROS 0.51 0.5 0 1
ROS 1-12 months ago 6.39 3.22 0 12
CEI 0.07 0.25 0 1
CEI 1-12 months ago 0.78 0.6 0 4
Sampling inspection 0.02 0.15 0 1
Sampling inspection 1-12 months ago 0.28 0.54 0 5
Non-monetary sanction 0.01 0.07 0 1
Non-monetary sanction 1-12 months ago 0.07 0.38 0 6
Monetary sanction 0.0002 0.01 0 1
Monetary sanction 1-12 months ago 0.003 0.05 0 1
Non-monetary sanction 4-15 months ago 3.49 3.19 0 11
on other plants in the same jurisdiction
Monetary sanction 4-15 months ago 0.13 0.34 0 1
on other plants in the same jurisdiction
mean temperature 50.66 17.65 11.11 81.96
Precipitation 0.09 0.05 0 0.51
Median income ($1000) 52.44 14.41 24.95 77.85
High school graduation rate 0.2 0.05 0.13 0.31
College degree rate 0.1 0.04 0.04 0.18
Unemployment rate 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.11
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Table 3.2: Estimation Results
POLS FE GMM
yi,t−1 0.613∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗
(0.042) (0.052) (0.178)
ROS 0.003 0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
ROS 1-12 months ago 0.002 0.001 -0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
CEI -0.003 -0.008 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
CEI 1-12 months ago 0.003 -0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Sampling inspection (SI) -0.002 -0.005 -0.016
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
SI 1-12 months ago 0.006 -0.002 -0.014∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Non-monetary sanction (NS) 0.076 0.051 0.056
(0.040) (0.038) (0.077)
NS 1-12 months ago 0.072∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ -0.033
(0.013) (0.015) (0.051)
Fine -0.108 -0.148 -0.253
(0.155) (0.157) (0.247)
Fine 1-12 months ago 0.071 -0.015 -0.129∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.049) (0.044)
NS 4-15 months ago on “others” 0.000 -0.001 0.003
in the “same” jurisdiction (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Fine 4-15 months ago on “others” 0.006 0.011 -0.019∗∗
in the “same” jurisdiction (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
NS 4-15 months ago on “others” -0.002∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002
in the “other” jurisdictions (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fine 4-15 months ago on “others” 0.002 0.002 -0.000
in the “other” jurisdictions (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
weather variables included included included
local community characteristics included included included
month dummies included included included
year dummies included included included
Intercept included included No intercept
Hansen test (χ21) [p-value] 0.700 [0.403]
AB-AR(1) test [p-value] -3.198 [0.001]
AB-AR(2) test [p-value] -0.090 [0.928]
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: Test of strict exogeneity of the regulatory activities on selves
FE
Forwarded ROS 0.002
(0.85)
Forwarded ROS -0.000
1-12 months ago (-0.16)
Forwarded CEI 0.006
(1.32)
Forwarded CEI -0.001
1-12 months ago (-1.81)
Forwarded sampling inspection 0.003
(0.58)
Forwarded sampling inspection -0.000
1-12 months ago (-0.11)
Forwarded Non-monetary sanction 0.065∗∗∗
(4.57)
Forwarded Non-monetary sanction 0.005∗∗
1-12 months ago (2.34)
Forwarded Fine 0.177
(0.87)
Forwarded Fine 0.037∗∗∗
1-12 months ago (9.71)
yi,t−1 included
Regulatory activities variables included
Weather variables included
Local community characteristics included
Month dummies included
Year dummies included
N 14027
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.4: Robustness of the two-step GMM estimation
GMM LIML
yi,t−1 0.409∗∗ 0.372
(-0.178) (-0.226)
ROS -0.001 -0.001
(-0.004) (-0.004)
ROS 1-12 months ago -0.005 -0.005
(-0.004) (-0.004)
CEI -0.007 -0.008
(-0.006) (-0.007)
CEI 1-12 months ago 0.003 0.002
(-0.006) (-0.006)
Sampling inspection -0.016 -0.014
(-0.011) (-0.01)
Sampling inspection -0.014∗ -0.014
1-12 months ago (-0.008) (-0.01)
Non-monetary sanction 0.056 0.048
(-0.077) (-0.084)
Non-monetary sanction -0.033 -0.041
1-12 months ago (-0.051) (-0.052)
Fine -0.253 -0.294
(-0.247) (-0.235)
Fine 1-12 months ago -0.129∗∗∗ -0.141
(-0.044) (-0.095)
Non-monetary sanction 4-15 months ago 0.003 0.002
on “others” in the “same” jurisdiction (-0.005) (-0.005)
Fine 4-15 months ago -0.019∗∗ -0.019
on “others” in the “same” jurisdiction (-0.01) (-0.013)
Non-monetary sanction 4-15 months ago -0.002 -0.002
on “others” in the “other” jurisdictions (-0.001) (-0.002)
Fine 4-15 months ago 0 -0.002
on “others” in the “other” jurisdictions (-0.007) (-0.007)
weather variables included included
local community characteristics included included
month dummies included included
year dummies included included
Intercept No intercept No intercept
Hansen test (χ21) [p-value] 0.700 [0.403] 0.364 [0.546]
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ON
THE ECONOMETRIC METHOD
A.1 Bernstein Polynomial
A Bernstein polynomial of order N is defined as follows (Lorentz, 1986):
BN(x) =
N∑
r=0
βr · br(x,N) =
N∑
r=0
βr ·
(
N
r
)
xr(1− x)N−r (A.1)
where βr are Bernstein coefficients that govern the shape of BN(x) and
br(x,N) =
(
N
r
)
xr(1 − x)N−r are Bernstein basis polynomials. Figure A.1
shows examples of a collection of Bernstein basis polynomials for N = 5, 10,
and 20.
Figure A.1: Bernstein Basis Polynomials of Varying Degrees
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A.2 The Bernstein Polynomial in Regression
As can be seen in equation (A.1), BN(x) is a linear combination of br(x,N)
and can be easily incorporated into a linear-in-parameter regression frame-
86
work. Specifically, for x (a vector of values observed for variable x), br(x, N)
are included as covariates along with other controls, and the resulting coeffi-
cient estimates correspond to βr. Once βr are estimated, we can recover an
estimate of BN(x). As an illustration, Figure A.2 shows the fit of an OLS
regression using Bernstein polynomials of degree 10 for three models, where
x ∼ Unif(0, 1) and ε ∼ N(0, 0.1).
There are many other possible choices of bases whose linear combination
flexibly represents a function, such as b-spline bases. However, we use the
Bernstein polynomial because it is particularly useful in placing some re-
strictions on the shape of the function to be estimated. Many economically
feasible properties of a function, such as monotonicity and convexity, can be
written in a linear form, as in Aβ ≥ b, where A is a real-valued matrix and
b is a real-valued vector. See Wang and Ghosh, 2012 for further details on
shape restriction using Bernstein basis polynomials.
Figure A.2: Examples of Semiparamateric Fits using Bernstein
Polynomials
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A.3 Technical Details on Monotonicity Impositions
The estimating equation is
Wi,y =γ0 + γ1CPy +
Kf∑
j=1
αj
( Ty∑
t=1
bj(Ri,t,y, Kf )
)
+
Kg∑
j=1
βj
( Ty∑
t=1
bj(cETi,t,y, Kg)
)
+ µi + εi,y (A.2)
Let Z and η denote the collection of all the covariates and coefficients, re-
spectively. Letting X˜ denote the within-transformed X1,
W˜i,y =γ1C˜P y +
Kf∑
j=1
αj
( Ty∑
t=1
b˜j(Ri,t,y, Kf )
)
+
Kg∑
j=1
βj
( Ty∑
t=1
b˜j(cETi,t,y, Kg)
)
+ ε˜i,y (A.3)
Let Z˜ denote the within-transformed covariates. Further let η = {γ1,α1,. . . ,
αKf ,β1,. . . , βKg} denote a collection of the coefficients. Fixed effects esti-
mates without a monotonicity imposition can be obtained by solving the
following minimization problem:2
Minη = ||W˜ − Z˜η||2 (A.4)
Monotonicity for fd(·) and gd(·) can be imposed by adding constraints Aη ≥ 0
to the above minimization problem for an appropriately chosen matrix A. Let
AR and AET be submatrices of A that pertain to α and β, respectively, such
that A is as follows:
A =
(
AR 0 0
0 AET 0
)
1Do not within transform Ri,t,y and ETi,t,y and then plug them into the Bernstein
basis polynomial, but bj(Ri,t,y,Kf ) and bj(cETi,t,y,Kg).
2Note that simply including an individual fixed effect results in exactly the same esti-
mates. However, the data is within-transformed to reduce the computational burden.
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To impose non-increasing monotonicity of fd(·), AR (Kf × Kf ) is set as
follows:
AR =

−1 0 0 . . . 0
1 −1 0 0 . . .
0 1 −1 0 . . .
. . .
0 . . . 0 1 −1

AR is slightly different from a constraint matrix defined in Wang and Ghosh,
2012 for non-decreasing monotonicity because b0(·, Kf ) is dropped. Analo-
gously, AET (Kg ×Kg) is set as follows:
AET =

1 0 0 . . . 0
−1 1 0 0 . . .
0 −1 1 0 . . .
. . .
0 . . . 0 −1 1

We find our estimates by solving the following constrained minimization
problem:
Minη = ||W − Zη||2
s.t. Aη ≥ 0 (A.5)
which is a simple quadratic programming problem.
A.4 Efficiency Gain over SR
Here, we report simple Monte Carlo simulation results on the efficiency of
SR and MBF econometric specifications. The considered model is
y =
150∑
t=1
g(xt) + v =
150∑
t=1
2 · (xt − 0.5)2 + v (A.6)
where xt ∼ Unif(0, 1) and v ∼ N(0, 0.1). In total, 1000 iterations are
conducted, with each iteration applying both SR and MBF specifications for
a data set of 1000 samples drawn from the above data-generating process.
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Here, Bernstein basis polynomials are used as the bases for both SR and
MBF. Figure A.3 compares the 95% confidence band for SR with 20 bins
(blue-shaded region) and MBF (red-shaded region). The efficiency gain in
using MBF specification is quite large. E[gˆ(·)] from both SR and MBF are
tightly aligned with g(·). When more bins are used in SR (40 bins), the
comparative advantage in efficiency of MBF diminishes, as can be seen in
Figure A.3. Nonetheless, the confidence interval from MBF is about half
that from SR.
Figure A.3: Efficiency Comparison of SR and MFB
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A.5 Spatial-Individual Double Block Bootstrap
The sampling method used in this study involves the following steps:
1. Create an empty data set.
2. Pick one well and all of its time-series observations without replacement
3. Find its spatial neighbors (k nearest) and all of their time-series obser-
vations without replacement
4. Update the data set by appending newly drawn data.
5. If the number of observations of the data set is smaller than that of
the original regression, repeat steps 2, 3, and 4. Otherwise, cut off the
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extra observations from the bottom to have exactly the same number
of observations as that of the original regression.
This arbitrary cutoff of extra observations does not affect the bootstrap re-
sults much because they comprise a small fraction of the entire data set.
Each sampling is followed by the monotonicity-imposed semi-parametric re-
gression with the Bernstein polynomial. Then 95% confidence intervals are
constructed by finding 2.5% and 97.5% empirical quantiles of the estimated
functions.
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APPENDIX B
MATHEMATICAL PROOFS
B.1 Value Functions, First Order Conditions, and
Proof of Proposition 1
Derivations of the value functions, first order conditions, and proof of propo-
sition 1 come simultaneously. We do so by means of mathematical induction
starting from k = 1 for x∗T−k (k = 2, . . . , T − 1). At the last period (t = T ),
the optimal irrigation amount x∗T = 0 because irrigation at time T does not
contribute to crop growth at time T . Therefore, x∗T = 0 irrespective of the
power control status. Given x∗T , the value functions VT (ST , 0) and VT (ST , 1)
are written as follows:
VT (ST , 0) = VT (ST , 1) = Y (ST ) (B.1)
(i) k = 1
Now, given VT (ST , 0) and VT (ST , 1),
VT−1(ST−1, 0) =Y (ST−1) + ρET−1
[
VT
(
α(βST−1 +RT−1), 0
)]
+ (1− ρ)ET−1
[
VT
(
α(βST−1 +RT−1), 1
)]
=Y (ST−1) + ET−1
[
Y
(
α(βST−1 +RT−1)
)]
(B.2)
where the expectation is taken over RT−1. The optimal irrigation problem,
given ST−1, can be formulated as follows:
Max{x} Y (ST−1)− Pw · x+ ρET−1
[
VT
(
α(βST−1 + θx+RT−1), 0
)]
+ (1− ρ)ET−1
[
VT
(
α(βST−1 + θx+RT−1), 1
)]
(B.3)
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The first order condition of the problem is as follows:
Pw =
∂
∂x
{
ρET−1
[
VT
(
α(βST−1 + θx+RT−1), 0
)]}
+
∂
∂x
{
(1− ρ)ET−1
[
VT (α(βST−1 + θx+RT−1), 1
)]}
⇒ Pw =αθρET−1
[
Y ′
(
α(βST−1 + θx+RT−1)
)]
+ (1− ρ)αθET−1
[
Y ′
(
α(βST−1 + θx+RT−1)
)]
⇒ Pw =αθET−1
[
Y ′
(
α(βST−1 + θx+RT−1)
)]
(B.4)
By dropping the subscript for R for the sake of conciseness, the expectation
part of the right-hand side of equation (B.4) can be written as a function of
y = βST−1 + θx as follows:
G1(y) = E
[
Y ′
(
α(y +R)
)]
=
∫ ∞
0
Y ′
(
α(y +R)
)
· f(R) dR (B.5)
By Assumption 1,
G′1(y) =α
∫ ∞
0
Y ′′
(
α(y +R)
)
· f(R) dR < 0
Thus, G1(y) is invertible and equation (B.4) can be solved in terms of y:
y =G−11 (
Pw
θ
) (B.6)
⇒ x =σ1
θ
− β
θ
ST−1 (B.7)
where σ1 depends on all the parameters and the distribution of RT−1 but is
independent of ST−1. Therefore, the optimal irrigation strategy is linear in
ST−1.
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Now, given x∗T−1,
VT−1(ST−1, 1) =Y (ST−1)− Pwx∗T−1
+ ρE
[
VT
(
α(βST−1 + θx∗T−1 +RT−1), 0
)]
+ (1− ρ)E
[
VT (α
(
βST−1 + θx∗T−1 +RT−1), 1
)]
VT−1(ST−1, 1) =Y (ST−1) +
βPw
θ
· ST−1 − σ1Pw
θ
+ ρE
[
VT
(
α(σ1 +RT−1), 0
)]
+ (1− ρ)E
[
VT
(
α(σ1 +RT−1), 1
)]
=Y (ST−1) +
βPw
θ
· ST−1 +B1 (B.8)
where B1 = ρE
[
VT
(
α(σ1 + RT−1), 0
)]
+ (1− ρ)E
[
VT
(
α(σ1 + RT−1), 1
)]
−
σ1Pw
θ
, which is independent of ST−1.
(i) k = 2
Given VT−1(ST−1, 0) and VT−1(ST−1, 1), we can solve the case for T−2. First,
VT−2(ST−2, 0) =Y (ST−2) + ρET−2
[
VT−1
(
α(βST−2 +RT−2), 0
)]
+ (1− ρ)ET−2
[
VT−1
(
α(βST−2 +RT−2), 1
)]
=Y (ST−2) + ρET−2
[
Y
(
α(βST−2 +RT−2)
)]
+ ρET−2ET−1
[
Y
(
α2β(βST−2 +RT−2) + αRT−1
)]
+ (1− ρ)ET−2
[
Y
(
α(βST−2 +RT−2)
)]
+
(1− ρ)βPw
θ
(
αβST−2 + αE[RT−2]
)
+ (1− ρ)B1
=Y (ST−2) + ET−2
[
Y
(
α(βST−2 +RT−2)
)]
+ ρET−2ET−1
[
Y (α2β(ST−2 +RT−2) + αRT−1)
]
+
(1− ρ)αβ2Pw
θ
ST−2 + A2 (B.9)
where A2 = (1−ρ)B1+ (1− ρ)βPw
θ
·E[RT−2], which is independent of ST−2.
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The optimal irrigation problem, given ST−2, can be formulated as follows:
Max{x} Y (ST−2)− Pw · x+ ρET−2
[
VT−1
(
α(βST−2 + θx+RT−2), 0
)]
+ (1− ρ)ET−2
[
VT−1
(
α(βST−2 + θx+RT−2), 1
)]
(B.10)
The first order condition of the problem is as follows:
Pw =θρ · ∂
∂x
{
ET−2
[
VT−1
(
α(βST−2 + θx+RT−2), 0
)]}
+ (1− ρ)θ · ∂
∂x
{
ET−2
[
VT−1
(
α(βST−2 + θx+RT−2), 1
)]}
⇒ Pw =αθρET−2
[
Y ′
(
α(βST−2 + θx+RT−2)
)]
+ α2βθρET−2ET−1
[
Y ′
(
α2β(βST−2 + θx+RT−2) + αRT−1
)]
+ αθ(1− ρ)ET−2
[
Y ′
(
α(βST−2 + θx+RT−2)
)]
+ θ(1− ρ)αβPw
θ
⇒ γ2 =αθET−2
[
Y ′
(
α(βST−2 + θx+RT−2)
)]
+ α2βθρET−2ET−1
[
Y ′
(
α2β(βST−2 + θx+RT−2) + αRT−1
)]
(B.11)
where γ2 = (1 − αβ(1 − ρ))Pw, a constant. Analogous with the previous
argument made for k = 1, the right-hand side is monotonic decreasing with
respect to βST−2 + θx. Therefore, there exists a function G2(·) such that
γ2 = G2(βST−2 + θx) and G′2(·) < 0. Thus,
G−12 (γ2) = βST−2 + θx
⇒ x = σ2
θ
− β
θ
ST−2 (B.12)
where σ2 = G
−1
2 (γ2). Now, given x
∗
T−2:
VT−2(ST−2, 1) =Y (ST−2) +
βPw
θ
· ST−2 − σ2Pw
θ
(B.13)
+ ρET−2
[
VT−1
(
α(σ2 +RT−2), 0
)]
+ (1− ρ)ET−2
[
VT−1
(
α(σ2 +RT−2), 1
)]
=Y (ST−2) +
βPw
θ
· ST−2 +B2 (B.14)
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where B2 = ρET−2
[
VT−1
(
α(σ2 + RT−2), 0
)]
+ (1 − ρ)ET−2
[
VT−1
(
α(σ2 +
RT−2), 1
)]
− σ2Pw
θ
, which is independent of ST−2.
(ii) k = n and k = n+ 1
Now suppose our claim holds when k = n (n ≥ 3), and we can write x∗T−n,
VT−n(ST−n, 0), and VT−n(ST−n, 1) as follows for some constants σn, An, and
Bn:
X∗T−n =σn −
β
θ
ST−n (B.15)
VT−n(ST−n, 1) =Y (ST−n) +
βPw
θ
· ST−n +Bn (B.16)
VT−n(ST−n, 0) =Y (ST−n) + E
[
Y
(
α(βST−n +RT−n)
)]
+
ρE
[
Y
(
α2β(βST−n +RT−n) + αRT−n+1
)]
+ · · ·+
ρn−1E
[
Y
(
αnβn−1(βST−n +RT−n) + αn−1βn−2RT−n+1
+ · · ·+ α2βRT−2 + αRT−1
)]
+
+
[
n∑
j=2
(αβρ)j−2
]
· (1− ρ)αβ
2Pw
θ
· ST−n + An (B.17)
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Now, given VT−n(ST−n, 0) and VT−n(ST−n, 1), VT−n−1(ST−n−1, 0) is as follows:
VT−n−1(ST−n−1, 0) =Y (ST−n−1) + ρE
[
VT−n
(
α(βST−n−1 +RT−n−1), 0
)]
+ (1− ρ)E
[
VT−n
(
α(βST−n−1 +RT−n−1), 1
)]
=Y (ST−n−1) + ρE
[
Y
(
α(βST−n−1 +RT−n−1)
)]
+
ρE
[
Y
(
α2β(βST−n−1 +RT−n−1) + αRT−n)
)]
+ · · ·+
ρnE
[
Y
(
αn+1βn(βST−n−1 +RT−n−1) + αnβn−1RT−n
+ · · ·+ α2βRT−2 + αRT−1
)]
+
[
n∑
j=2
(αβρ)j−2
]
· (1− ρ)αβ
2Pw
θ
· ρE[α(βST−n−1 +RT−n−1)]+
(1− ρ)E
[
Y
(
α(βST−n−1 +RT−n−1)
)]
+
(1− ρ)βPw
θ
E[α(βST−n−1 +RT−n−1)]
+ ρAn + (1− ρ)Bn
=Y (ST−n−1) + ρE
[
Y
(
α(βST−n−1 +RT−n−1)
)]
+
ρ2E
[
Y
(
α2β(βST−n−1 +RT−n−1) + αRT−n)
)]
+ · · ·+
ρnE
[
Y
(
αn+1βn(βST−n−1 +RT−n−1) + αnβn−1RT−n
+ · · ·+ α2βRT−2 + αRT−1
)]
+[
n+1∑
j=2
(αβρ)j−2
]
· (1− ρ)αβ
2Pw
θ
· ST−n−1 + An+1
(B.18)
where An+1 =
[
n+1∑
j=2
(αβρ)j−2
]
· (1 − ρ)αβ
2Pw
θ
ρE[RT−n−1] + ρAn + (1 −
ρ)Bn, which is independent of ST−n−1. Therefore, our claim for the form of
VT−n−1(ST−n−1, 0) holds for n+1. Now, given VT−n(ST−n, 0) and VT−n(ST−n, 1),
the optimal irrigation problem given ST−n−1 can be formulated as follows:
Max{x} Y (ST−n−1)− Pw · x+ ρE
[
VT−n
(
α(βST−n−1 + θx+RT−n−1), 0
)]
+ (1− ρ)E
[
VT−n
(
α(βST−n−1 + θx+RT−n−1), 1
)]
(B.19)
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The first order condition is as follows:
Pw =ρ · ∂
∂x
{
ET−n−1
[
VT−n
(
α(βST−n−1 + θx+RT−n−1), 0
)]}
+ (1− ρ) · ∂
∂x
{
ET−n−1
[
VT−n
(
α(βST−n−1 + θx+RT−n−1), 1
)]}
⇒ Pw =θαρE
[
Y ′
(
α(βST−n−1 + θx+RT−n−1)
)]
+
θα2βρE
[
Y ′
(
α2β · (βST−n−1 + θx+RT−n−1) + αRT−n
)]
+ · · ·+
θαn+1βnρnE
[
Y ′
(
αn+1βn(βST−n−1 + θx+RT−n−1) + αnβn−1RT−n
+ · · ·+ α2βRT−2 + αRT−1
)]
+
θρ
[
n∑
j=2
(αβρ)j−2
]
· (1− ρ)αβ
2Pw
θ
· α+
θα(1− ρ)E
[
Y ′
(
α(βST−n−1 +RT−n−1)
)]
+ θ(1− ρ)αβPw
θ
⇒ Pw =θαE
[
Y ′
(
α(βST−n−1 + θx+RT−n−1)
)]
+
θα2βρE
[
Y ′
(
α2β · (βST−n−1 + θx+RT−n−1) + αRT−n
)]
+ · · ·+
θαn+1βnρnE
[
Y ′
(
αn+1βn(βST−n−1 + θx+RT−n−1) + αnβn−1RT−n
+ · · ·+ α2βRT−2 + αRT−1
)]
+
θ
[
n+1∑
j=2
(αβρ)j−2
]
· (1− ρ)αβPw
θ
=θ
k∑
i=1
αiρi−1βi−1E
[
Y ′
(
αiβi−1(βST−k + θx) +
i∑
j=1
αjβj−1RT−k−j+i
)]
+ (1− ρ)αβ · Pw
[
k−1∑
j=1
(αβρ)j−1
]
(B.20)
Note that each component of the right-hand side is monotonic decreasing in
βST−n−1 + θx except the last term, which is a constant. Thus, there exists a
function Gn+1(·) with G′n+1(·) < 0 such that
Pw
{
1−
[
n+1∑
j=2
(αβρ)j−2
]
· (1− ρ)αβ
}
= Gn+1(βST−n−1 + θx) (B.21)
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Since Gn+1(·) is invertible,
βST−n−1 + θx =G−1n+1
(
Pw
{
1−
[
n+1∑
j=2
(αβρ)j−2
]
· (1− ρ)αβ
})
⇒ x =σn+1
θ
− β
θ
ST−n−1 (B.22)
where σn+1 = G
−1
n+1
(
Pw
{
1−
[
n+1∑
j=2
(αβρ)j−2
]
· (1− ρ)αβ
})
. Therefore,
the optimal irrigation is linear in ST−n−1, as claimed.
Finally, VT−n−1(ST−n−1, 0) can be written as follows:
VT−n−1(ST−n−1, 1) =Y (ST−n−1)− σn+1Pw
θ
+
βPw
θ
· ST−n−1+
ρE
[
VT−n
(
α(σn+1 +RT−n−1), 0
)]
+
(1− ρ)E
[
VT−n
(
α(σn+1 +RT−n−1), 1
)]
=Y (ST−n−1) +
βPw
θ
· ST−n−1 +Bn+1 (B.23)
where Bn+1 = ρE
[
VT−n
(
α(σn+1 +RT−n−1), 0
)]
+ (1− ρ)E
[
VT−n
(
α(σn+1 +
RT−n−1), 1
)]
− σn+1Pw
θ
, which is independent of ST−n−1. Therefore, our
claim for the form of VT−n−1(ST−n−1, 0) holds as well.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let SˆT−k+n denote the soil moisture level at time T − k + n when x∗T−k is
applied at T − k and power control is continuous for all the periods until
T − k + n1. Substituting in the optimal amount of irrigation x∗, the first
order condition at equilibrium (for sufficiently large k) is written as follows:
Pw(
1− αβ
1− αβρ) =θE[αY
′(SˆT−k+1)] + θρE[α2βY ′(SˆT−k+2)] + · · ·+
θρk−1E[αkβk−1Y ′(SˆT )] (B.24)
1For example, SˆT−k+1 = α(σ + RT−k), SˆT−k+2 = α2β(σ + RT−k) + αRT−k+1, and
SˆT−k+3 = α3β2(σ +RT−k) + α2βRT−k+1 + αβRT−k+2
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Now, differentiating both sides with respect to ρ,
Pwαβ
1− αβ
(1− αβρ)2 =θ
2
{
α2E[Y ′′(SˆT−k+1)] + ρ(α2β)2E[Y ′′(SˆT−k+2)]
+ · · ·+ ρk−1(αkβk−1)2E[Y ′′(SˆT )]
}
∂x∗
∂ρ
+ θ
{
α2βE[Y ′(SˆT−k+2)] + 2α3β2ρE[Y ′(SˆT−k+3)]
+ · · ·+ (k − 1)αkβk−1ρk−2E[Y ′(SˆT )]
}
(B.25)
Now, we denote the two components of the right-hand side of equation (B.25)
as follows:
A =θ2
{
α2E[Y ′′(SˆT−k+1)] + ρ(α2β)2E[Y ′′(SˆT−k+2)]
+ · · ·+ ρk−1(αkβk−1)2E[Y ′′(SˆT )]
}
∂x∗
∂ρ
B =θ
{
α2βE[Y ′(SˆT−k+2)] + 2α3β2ρE[Y ′(SˆT−k+3)]
+ · · ·+ (k − 1)αkβk−1ρk−2E[Y ′(SˆT )]
}
Then equation (B.25) is written as follows:
Pwαβ
1− αβ
(1− αβρ) ·
αβ
1− αβρ = A+B
Pwαβ
1− αβ
(1− αβρ) · αβ = (1− αβρ)A+ (1− αβρ)B (B.26)
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By substituting equation (B.24) into the left-hand side of the above equation,
it becomes the following:
(αβρ− 1)A =− θ
{
α2βE[Y ′(SˆT−k+1)] + α3β2ρE[Y ′(SˆT−k+2)]
+ · · ·+ αkβk−1ρk−2E[Y ′(SˆT−k+k)]
}
+ (1− αβρ)B
=− θ
{
α2βE[Y ′(SˆT−k+1)] + α3β2ρE[Y ′(SˆT−k+2)]
+ · · ·+ αkβk−1ρk−2E[Y ′(SˆT−k+k)]
}
+ θ
{
α2βE[Y ′(SˆT−k+2)] + 2α3β2ρE[Y ′(SˆT−k+3)]
+ · · ·+ (k − 1)αkβk−1ρk−2E[Y ′(SˆT )]
}
− αβρθ
{
α2βE[Y ′(SˆT−k+2)] + 2α3β2ρE[Y ′(SˆT−k+3)]
+ · · ·+ (k − 1)αkβk−1ρk−2E[Y ′(SˆT )]
}
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(αβρ− 1)A =− θ
{
α2βE[Y ′(SˆT−k+1)] + 2α3β2ρE[Y ′(SˆT−k+2)]
+ · · ·+ (k − 1)αkβk−1ρk−2E[Y ′(SˆT−1)]
+ kαk+1βkρk−1E[Y ′(SˆT )]
}
+ θ
{
α2βE[Y ′(SˆT−k+2)] + 2α3β2ρE[Y ′(SˆT−k+3)]
+ · · ·+ (k − 1)αkβk−1ρk−2E[Y ′(SˆT )]
}
=θ
{
α2β
(
E[Y ′(SˆT−k+2)]− E[Y ′(SˆT−k+1)]
)
+ 2α3β2ρ
(
E[Y ′(SˆT−k+3)]− E[Y ′(SˆT−k+2)]
)
+ · · ·+ (k − 1)αkβk−1ρk−2
(
E[Y ′(SˆT )]− E[Y ′(SˆT−1)]
)}
− kαk+1βkρk−1E[Y ′(SˆT )] (B.27)
Note that for ET−k+m+1[Y ′(SˆT−k+m)] in the above expression, expectation
is taken over RT−k, RT−k+1, . . . , RT−k+m. Therefore, by the law of iterated
expectation, for any m (= 1, 2, . . . , k):
E[Y ′(SˆT−k+m+1)]− E[Y ′(SˆT−k+m)]
=ET−k · · ·ET−k+m
[
ET−k+m+1
[
Y ′(SˆT−k+m+1)− Y ′(SˆT−k+m)
∣∣∣RT−k,
. . . , RT−k+m
]]
=ET−k · · ·ET−k+m
[
ET−k+m+1
[
Y ′(SˆT−k+m+1)
∣∣∣RT−k, . . . , RT−k+m]
− Y ′(SˆT−k+m)
]
(B.28)
Now, by Assumption 1,
E[SˆT−k+m+1|RT−k, . . . , RT−k+m] = αβSˆT−k+m + αE[RT−k+m] < SˆT−k+m
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Thus,
Y ′(E[SˆT−k+m+1|RT−k, . . . , RT−k+m]) > Y ′(SˆT−k+m)
By Jensen’s inequality,
ET−k+m+1[Y ′(SˆT−k+m+1)|RT−k, . . . , RT−k+m]
> Y ′(E[SˆT−k+m+1|RT−k, . . . , RT−k+m])
Therefore, ET−k+m+1[Y ′(SˆT−k+m+1)|RT−k, . . . , RT−k+m] > Y ′(SˆT−k+m). Thus,
every single component of the first term of the right-hand side of the above
equation is positive. Finally, by assumption 2, as k becomes sufficiently large,
the last term goes infinitesimally close to 0.
Now αβρ − 1 in the left-hand side of equation B.27 is always negative.
Furthermore, the coefficient on ∂x∗/∂ρ in A is always negative. Therefore,
∂x∗/∂ρ > 0.
B.3 Expected Total Irrigation
The ex ante expected value of irrigation per irrigation opportunity at t,
conditional on no energy supply interruption, is as follows:
E[x∗t ] =
σt
θ
− β
θ
E[St] (B.29)
Thus, the expected value of irrigation, which will be denoted as E[IRt], is
E[IRt] = (1− ρ)E[x∗t ] = (1− ρ)(
σt
θ
− β
θ
E[St]) (B.30)
Differentiating both sides with respect to ρ,
∂E[IRt]
∂ρ
=
1
θ
{
(1− ρ)(∂σt
∂ρ
− β · ∂E[St]
∂ρ
)− (σt − βE[St])
}
We know that
∂σt
∂ρ
> 0 (see Appendix B) and also that σt > 0. Now, E[St],
the ex ante (before irrigation season starts) expected soil moisture level at t,
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is mathematically represented as follows:
E[St] = (1− ρ)α
t−1∑
i=1
ρi−1
{
(αβ)i−1σt−i +
i∑
j=1
(αβ)j−1E[Rt−j]
}
+ ρt−1
{
(αβ)t−1S1 + α
t−1∑
j=1
(αβ)j−1E[Rt−j]
}
> 0 (B.31)
where S1 is the starting soil moisture level. Differentiating with respect to ρ,
∂E[St]
∂ρ
=− α
t−1∑
i=1
ρi−1
{
(αβ)i−1σt−i +
i∑
j=1
(αβ)j−1E[Rt−j]
}
+ (1− ρ)α
[ t−1∑
i=1
(i− 1)ρi−2
{
(αβ)i−1σt−i +
i∑
j=1
(αβ)j−1E[Rt−j]
}]
+ (1− ρ)α
[ t−1∑
i=1
ρi−1(αβ)i−1
∂σt−i
∂ρ
]
+ (t− 1)ρt−2
{
(αβ)t−1S1 + α
t−1∑
j=1
(αβ)j−1E[Rt−j]
}
(B.32)
The sign of
∂E[St]
∂ρ
is ambiguous. The sign of
∂E[IRt]
∂ρ
is ambiguous as well.
B.4 Comparative Statics on the Expected Value of
Rainfall
First, we show that a reduction in the expected value of rainfall in the future
leads to higher optimal irrigation. In general, any random variable can be
decomposed into a fixed part and a random part. Define γt and εt such that
Rt = γt + εt and γt = E[Rt] (E[εt] = 0). Using this notation, the first order
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condition at T − k can be written as follows:
Pw =θ
k∑
i=1
αiρi−1βi−1E
[
Y ′
(
αiβi−1σT−k
+
i∑
j=1
αjβj−1(γT−k−j+i + εT−k−j+i)
)]
+ (1− ρ)αβ · Pw
[
k−1∑
j=1
(αβρ)j−1
]
(B.33)
Differentiating both sides with respect to γT−m (1 ≤ m ≤ k),
0 =
k∑
i=k−m+1
αiρi−1βi−1E
[
Y ′′
(
αiβi−1σT−k
+
i∑
j=1
αjβj−1(γT−k−j+i + εT−k−j+i)
)]
· (αiβi−1 · ∂σT−k
∂γT−m
+ αi−k+mβi−1−k+m) (B.34)
Now, denote
ηi = α
iρi−1βi−1E
[
Y ′′
(
αiβi−1σT−k +
i∑
j=1
αjβj−1(γT−k−j+i + εT−k−j+i)
)]
(B.35)
Then
∂σT−k
∂γT−m
= −
∑k
i=k−m+1 ηiα
iβi−1∑k
i=k−m+1 ηiα
i−k+mβi−1−k+m
< 0 (B.36)
Therefore, reduction in the mean of rainfall in any of the current or future
periods will reduce the optimal amount of irrigation.
To show that proposition 3 holds, when ρ = 0,
∂σT−k
∂γm
= 0 for m =
1, 2, . . . , k − 1. This immediately indicates that
∂σT−k
∂γT−m
∣∣∣
ρ=0
>
∂σT−k
∂γT−m
∣∣∣
ρ>0
(B.37)
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However, when m = k,
∂σT−k
∂γT−m
∣∣∣
ρ>0
= −
∑k
i=1 ηiα
iβi−1∑k
i=1 ηiα
iβi−1
= −1 = −η1α
η1α
=
∂σT−k
∂γm
∣∣∣
ρ=0
(B.38)
This means that a change in the expected value of the rainfall immediately
after the current irrigation period has an impact of the same magnitude on
optimal irrigation.
B.5 Uncertainty in Rainfall
First we prove that a mean-preserving spread of rainfall will unambiguously
lead to an increase in the amount of optimal irrigation per irrigation oppor-
tunity. The first order condition at T − k is as follows:
Pw =θ
k∑
i=1
αiρi−1βi−1E
[
Y ′
(
αiβi−1σT−k +
i∑
j=1
αjβj−1(RT−k−j+i)
)]
+ (1− ρ)αβ · Pw
[
k−1∑
j=1
(αβρ)j−1
]
(B.39)
Now consider two distribution functions of RT−m (1 ≤ m ≤ k), FT−m(R) and
GT−m(R), where GT−m(R) is a mean-preserving spread of FT−m(R). It is well
known that FT−m(R) second-order stochastically dominates GT−m(R): that
is,
∫ ∞
−∞
u(R)dFT−m(R) >
∫ ∞
−∞
u(R)dGT−m(R) when u(R) is concave. Here,
the function of interest, Y ′(·), is convex in R, and GT−m(R) second-order
stochastically dominates FT−m(R), instead. Therefore, a mean-preserving
spread of the distribution of RT−m results in a rightward shift of the right-
hand side of the first order condition. Moreover, the left-hand side of the first
order condition remains unchanged. As a consequence, it increases the opti-
mal amount of irrigation per irrigation opportunity. Therefore, irrespective
of the existence of power control, an increase in uncertainty about rainfall
will increase the optimal amount of irrigation per irrigation opportunity.
Lemmas 1 and 2 immediately suggest that the impact of a mean-preserving
spread of the distribution of RT−m on xT−k (m < k) is greater when energy
supply interruption is present. When m = k, it is much more complicated.
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We know that when there is no power control (ρ = 0), the optimal target
soil moisture level, σt, satisfies the following first order condition:
Pw(1− αβ2) =θαE
[
Y ′
(
α(σT−k +RT−k)
)]
=θα
∫
R+
Y ′
(
ασT−k + αr
)
f(r)dr (B.40)
Consider a infinitesimally small perturbation εφ(r) to the distribution func-
tion of RT−k, F (r), so that the resulting distribution function G(r) = F (r)+
εφ(r) is a mean-preserving spread of F (r). The functional derivative of the
integrand (denoted as J) in the above equation is now as follows:
δJ
δF
= αY ′′
(
ασT−k(F ) + αr
)
· f(r) · ∂σT−k(F )
∂F
− αY ′′
(
ασT−k(F ) + αr
)
(B.41)
Thus, the functional differential is
δJ =
∫
R+
δJ
δF
φ(r)dr =α · ∂σT−k(F )
∂F
∫
R+
Y ′′
(
ασT−k(F ) + αr
)
· f(r) · φ(r)dr
− α
∫
R+
Y ′′
(
ασT−k(F ) + αr
)
φ(r)dr (B.42)
Since the functional differential of the left-hand side is 0, δJ must be 0 as
well. Therefore,
∂σT−k(F )
∂F
∣∣∣
ρ=0
=
∫
R+
Y ′′
(
ασT−k(F ) + αr
)
φ(r)dr∫
R+
Y ′′
(
ασT−k(F ) + αr
)
· f(r) · φ(r)dr
>0 (by construction of φ(r)) (B.43)
Now consider the marginal impact of the same perturbation when there is
energy supply interruption. The ith term of the first summation of the first
order condition is the following:
Ji = α
iρi−1βi−1E
[
Y ′
(
αiβi−1σT−k +
i∑
j=1
αjβj−1(RT−k−j+i)
)]
(B.44)
where the expectation is taken over Rs for s = T−k, T−k+1, . . . , T−k+i−1.
Now, denoting the integrals of Y ′(·) over all Rs except s = T−k as E−[Y ′(·)],
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Ji can be written as follows:
Ji =α
iρi−1βi−1
∫
R+
E−
[
Y ′
(
αiβi−1σT−k + αiβi−1r
+
i−1∑
j=1
αjβj−1(RT−k−j+i)
)]
f(r)dr (B.45)
Analogously with J , the functional differential of Ji with respect to F (r) is
the following:
δJi =α
2iρi−1β2(i−1) · ∂σT−k(F )
∂F
∫
R+
E−
[
Y ′′
(
Si + α
iβi−1r
)]
f(r)φ(r)dr
− α2iρi−1β2(i−1) ·
∫
R+
E−
[
Y ′′
(
(Si + α
iβi−1r
)]
φ(r)dr (B.46)
where Si = α
iβi−1σT−k(F ) +
i−1∑
j=1
αjβj−1(RT−k−j+i). Since the functional
differential of the left-hand side is 0, the functional differential of the right-
hand side must be 0. This condition leads to the following:
∂σT−k(F )
∂F
∣∣∣
ρ>0
=
∑k
i=1 α
2iρi−1β2(i−1)
∫
R+
E−
[
Y ′′
(
Si + α
iβi−1r
)]
φ(r)dr∑k
i=1 α
2iρi−1β2(i−1)
∫
R+
E−
[
Y ′′
(
Si + αiβi−1r
)]
f(r)φ(r)dr
(B.47)
The sign of
∂σT−k(F )
∂F
∣∣∣
ρ>0
−∂σT−k(F )
∂F
∣∣∣
ρ=0
depends crucially on the curvature
of the crop-water function at which it is evaluated for each i of the term, and
thus cannot be signed definitively.
108
REFERENCES
Becker, Gary S (1968). “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”.
The Journal of Political Economy 76(2): 169–217.
Nerlove, Marc (1971). “Further Evidence on the Estimation of Dynamic Eco-
nomic Relations from a Time Series of Cross Sections”. Econometrica
39(2): 359–382.
Anderson, T. W. and Cheng Hsiao (1981). “Estimation of Dynamic Models
with Error Components”. Journal of the American Statistical Association
76(375): 598–606.
Bras, R. L. and J. R. Cordova (1981). “An Intraseasonal Dynamic Optimiza-
tion Model to Allocate Irrigation Water between Crops”. Water Resources
Research 17(4): 866–874.
Nickell, Stephen (1981). “Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects”.
Econometrica 49(6): 1417–1426.
Rhenals, Alonso E. and Rafael L. Bras (1981). “The Irrigation Schedul-
ing Problem and Evapotranspiration Uncertainty”. Water Resources Re-
search 17(5): 1328–1338.
Aigner, Dennis J. and Edward E. Leamer (1984). “Estimation of time-of-use
pricing response in the absence of experimental data : An application of
the methodology of data transferability”. Journal of Econometrics 26(1-
2): 205–227.
Caves, Douglas W., Laurits R. Christensen, and Joseph A. Herriges (1984).
“Consistency of residential customer response in time-of-use electricity
pricing experiments”. Journal of Econometrics 26(1-2): 179–203.
Hausman, Jerry A. and John Trimble (1984). “Appliance purchase and usage
adaptation to a permanent time-of-day electricity rate schedule”. Journal
of Econometrics 26(1-2): 115–139.
109
Howrey, E. Philip and Hal R. Varian (1984). “Estimating the distributional
impact of time-of-day pricing of electricity”. Journal of Econometrics
26(1-2): 65–82.
Park, Rolla Edward and Jan Paul Acton (1984). “Large business customer
response to time-of-day electricity rates”. Journal of Econometrics 26(1-
2): 229–252.
Nieswiadomy, Michael (1985). “The Demand for Irrigation Water in the High
Plains of Texas, 1957-80”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics
67(3): 619–626.
Lorentz, George G (1986). Bernstein polynomials. second edition. New York:
Chelsea Publishing Company.
McGuckin, J. Thomas, Craig Mapel, Robert Lansford, and Ted Sammis
(1987). “Optimal Control of Irrigation Scheduling Using a Random Time
Frame”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69(1): 123–133.
Harrington, Winston (1988). “Enforcement leverage when penalties are re-
stricted”. Journal of Public Economics 37(1): 29–53.
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, Whitney Newey, and Harvey S Rosen (1988). “Esti-
mating Vector Autoregressions with Panel Data”. Econometrica 56(6):
1371–95.
Ogg, Clayton W. and Noel R. Gollehon (1989). “Western irrigation response
to pumping costs: A water demand analysis using climatic regions”. Water
Resources Research 25(5): 767–773.
Train, Kenneth E. and Nate Toyama (1989). “Pareto Dominance Through
Self-Selecting Tariffs: The Case of TOU Electricity Rates for Agricultural
Customers”. The Energy Journal 10(1): 91–109.
Yaron, Dan and Ariel Dinar (1989). “Optimal Allocation of Farm Irriga-
tion Water during Peak Seasons”. American Journal of Agricultural Eco-
nomics 64(4): 681–689.
Magat, Wesley A and W Kip Viscusi (1990). “Effectiveness of the EPA’s Reg-
ulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Eﬄuent Standards”. Journal
of Law and Economics 33(2): 331–60.
Rao, N. H., P. B. S. Sarma, and Subhash Chander (1990). “Optimal multicrop
allocation of seasonal and intraseasonal irrigation water”. Water Resource
Research 26(4): 551–559.
110
Arellano, Manuel and Stephen Bond (1991). “Some tests of specification
for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment
equations”. The review of economic studies 58(2): 277–297.
Deily, Mary E and Wayne B Gray (1991). “Enforcement of pollution regula-
tions in a declining industry”. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 21(3): 260–274.
Gray, Wayne B and Carol Adaire Jones (1991). “Are OSHA Health Inspec-
tions Effective? A Longitudinal Study in the Manufacturing Sector”. The
Review of Economics and Statistics 73(3): 504–08.
Martin, Derrel L. and James R. Gilley (1993). National Engineering Hand-
book, Part 623. Chapter 2. Irrigation Water Requirements. Tech. rep.
USDA, Soil Conservation Service.
Frasier, W. Marshall and George H. Pfeiffer (1994). “Optimal replacement
and management policies for beef cows.” American Journal of Agricul-
tural Economics 76(4): 859–874.
Altonji, Joseph G. and Lewis M. Segal (1996). “Small-Sample Bias in GMM
Estimation of Covariance Structures”. Journal of Business & Economic
Statistics 14(3): 353–366.
Eto, Joseph H. (1996). “The Past, Present, and Future of U.S. Utility Demand-
Side Management Programs”.
Gray, Wayne B. and Mary E. Deily (1996). “Compliance and Enforcement:
Air Pollution Regulation in the U.S. Steel Industry”. Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management 31(1): 96–111.
Laplante, Benoıt and Paul Rilstone (1996). “Environmental inspections and
emissions of the pulp and paper industry in Quebec”. Journal of Envi-
ronmental Economics and Management 31(1): 19–36.
Naylor, Rosamond L. (1996). “Energy and Resource Constraints on Intensive
Agricultural Production”. Annual Review of Energy and the Environment
21(1): 99–123.
Allen, Richard G., Luis S. Pereira, Dirk Raes, and Martin Smith (1998).
“Crop evapotranspiration - Guidelines for computing crop water require-
ments - FAO Irrigation and drainage paper 56”. FAO Irrigation and
drainage paper.
Blundell, Richard and Stephen Bond (1998). “Initial conditions and mo-
ment restrictions in dynamic panel data models”. Journal of Economet-
rics 87(1): 115–143.
111
Helland, Eric (1998). “The enforcement of pollution control laws: Inspections,
violations, and self-reporting”. Review of Economics and Statistics 80(1):
141–153.
Cohen, Mark A (1999). “Monitoring and enforcement of environmental pol-
icy”. International yearbook of environmental and resource economics 3
44–106.
Gulyani, Sumila (1999). “Innovating with Infrastructure: How India’s Largest
Carmaker Copes with Poor Electricity Supply”. World Development 27(10):
1749–1768.
Koenker, Roger and Jose´ AF Machado (1999). “GMM inference when the
number of moment conditions is large”. Journal of Econometrics 93(2):
327–344.
Droogers, P (2000). “Estimating actual evapotranspiration using a detailed
agro-hydrological model”. Journal of Hydrology 229(1): 50–58.
Bowsher, Clive G (2002). “On testing overidentifying restrictions in dynamic
panel data models”. Economics Letters 77(2): 211–220.
Do¨ll, Petra (2002). “Impact of climate change and variability on irrigation
requirements: a global perspective”. Climatic Change 54(3): 269–293.
Malik, R. P. S. (2002). “Water-Energy Nexus in Resource-poor Economies:
The Indian Experience”. International Journal of Water Resources De-
velopment 18(1): 47–58.
Stafford, Sarah L. (2002). “The Effect of Punishment on Firm Compliance
with Hazardous Waste Regulations”. Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management 44(2): 290–308.
Adenikinju, Adeola F (2003). “Electric infrastructure failures in Nigeria: a
survey-based analysis of the costs and adjustment responses”. Energy
Policy 31(14): 1519–1530.
Alcamo, Joseph, Petra Do¨ll, Thomas Henrichs, Frank Kaspar, Bernhard
Lehner, Thomas Ro¨sch, and Stefan Siebert (2003). “Development and
testing of the WaterGAP 2 global model of water use and availability”.
Hydrological Sciences Journal 48(3): 317–337.
Shah, Tushaar, Christopher Scott, Avinash Kishore, and Abhishek Sharma
(2003). Energy-Irrigation Nexus in South Asia: Approaches to Agrarian
Prosperity with Viable Power Industry. Tech. rep. International Water
Management Institute.
112
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2004). “How
much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates?” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 119(1): 249–275.
Earnhart, Dietrich (2004a). “Panel data analysis of regulatory factors shaping
environmental performance”. Review of Economics and Statistics 86(1):
391–401.
— (2004b). “Regulatory factors shaping environmental performance at publicly-
owned treatment plants”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Man-
agement 48(1): 655 –681.
Scott, Christopher A. and Tushaar Shah (2004). “Groundwater overdraft re-
duction through agricultural energy policy: insights from India and Mex-
ico”. International Journal of Water Resources Development 20(2): 149–
164.
Shani, Uri, Yacov Tsur, and Amos Zemel (2004). “Optimal dynamic irriga-
tion schemes”. Optimal Control Applications and Methods 25(2): 91–106.
Gray, Wayne B. and John M. Mendeloff (2005). “The declining effects of
OSHA inspections on manufacturing injuries, 1979 to 1998”. Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 58(4): 571–587.
Gray, Wayne B and Ronald J. Shadbegian (2005). “When and Why do Plants
Comply? Paper Mills in the 1980s”. Law & Policy 27(2): 238–261.
Guerra, L.C., G. Hoogenboom, J.E. Hook, D.L. Thomas, V.K. Boken, and
K.A. Harrison (2005). “Evaluation of on-farm irrigation applications using
the simulation model EPIC”. English. Irrigation Science 23(4): 171–181.
Llamas, Manuel Ramo´n and Pedro Mart´ınez-Santos (2005). “Intensive ground-
water use: silent revolution and potential source of social conflicts”. Jour-
nal of Water Resources Planning and Management 131(5): 337–341.
Shimshack, Jay P. and Michael B. Ward (2005a). “Regulator reputation,
enforcement, and environmental compliance”. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 50(3): 519–540.
— (2005b). “Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental com-
pliance”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 50(3):
519–540.
Prasad, A Srinivasa, NV Umamahesh, and GK Viswanath (2006). “Opti-
mal irrigation planning under water scarcity”. Journal of Irrigation and
Drainage engineering 132(3): 228–237.
113
Scheierling, Susanne M., John B. Loomis, and Robert A. Young (2006). “Ir-
rigation water demand: A meta-analysis of price elasticities”. Water Re-
sources Research. doi: 10.1029/2005WR004009.
Schlenker, Wolfram, W. Michael Hanemann, and Anthony C. Fisher (2006).
“The Impact of Global Warming on U.S. Agriculture: An Econometric
Analysis of Optimal Growing Conditions”. The Review of Economics and
Statistics 88(1): 113–125.
Schoengold, Karina, David L. Sunding, and Georgina Moreno (2006). “Price
elasticity reconsidered: Panel estimation of an agricultural water demand
function”. Water Resources Research. doi: 10.1029/2005WR004096.
Wood, Simon N (2006). Generalized Additive Models: An Introduction with
R. Chapman & Hall/CRC.
Bondeau, Alberte, Pascalle C Smith, Soenke Zaehle, Sibyll Schaphoff, Wolf-
gang Lucht, Wolfgang Cramer, Dieter Gerten, Hermann Lotze-Campen,
Christoph Mu¨ller, Markus Reichstein, et al. (2007). “Modelling the role of
agriculture for the 20th century global terrestrial carbon balance”. Global
Change Biology 13(3): 679–706.
Fischer, Ganther, Francesco N. Tubiello, Harrij van Velthuizen, and David
A. Wiberg (2007). “Climate change impacts on irrigation water require-
ments: Effects of mitigation, 1990-2080”. Technological Forecasting and
Social Change 74(7): 1083–1107.
Rodr´ıguez Dı´az, J.A., E.K. Weatherhead, J.W. Knox, and E. Camacho (2007).
“Climate change impacts on irrigation water requirements in the Guadalquivir
river basin in Spain”. Regional Environmental Change 7 (3), 149–159.
Schlenker, Wolfram, W.Michael Hanemann, and AnthonyC. Fisher (2007).
“Water Availability, Degree Days, and the Potential Impact of Climate
Change on Irrigated Agriculture in California”. Climatic Change 81(1):
19–38.
Angrist, Joshua D and Jo¨rn-Steffen Pischke (2008). Mostly harmless econo-
metrics: An empiricist’s companion. Princeton university press.
Rost, Stefanie, Dieter Gerten, Alberte Bondeau, Wolfgang Lucht, Janine Ro-
hwer, and Sibyll Schaphoff (2008). “Agricultural green and blue water
consumption and its influence on the global water system”. Water Re-
sources Research. doi: 10.1029/2007WR006331.
Shah, Tushaar, Sonal Bhatt, R.K. Shah, and Jayesh Talati (2008). “Ground-
water governance through electricity supply management: Assessing an
114
innovative intervention in Gujarat, western India”. Agricultural Water
Management 95(11): 1233 –1242.
Shimshack, Jay P. and Michael B. Ward (2008). “Enforcement and over-
compliance”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 55(1):
90–105.
Thomas, Axel (2008). “Agricultural irrigation demand under present and
future climate scenarios in China”. Global and Planetary Change 60(3):
306–326.
Bulatewicz, T., W. Jin, S. Staggenborg, S. Lauwo, M. Miller, S. Das, D.
Andresen, J. Peterson, D. R. Steward, and S. M. Welch (2009). “Calibra-
tion of a crop model to irrigated water use using a genetic algorithm”.
Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 13(8): 1467–1483.
Farahani, Hamid J., Gabriella Izzi, and Theib Y. Oweis (2009). “Parame-
terization and Evaluation of the AquaCrop Model for Full and Deficit
Irrigated Cotton”. Agronomy Journal 101(3): 469–476.
Keohane, Nathaniel O, Erin T Mansur, and Andrey Voynov (2009). “Avert-
ing regulatory enforcement: evidence from new source review”. Journal
of Economics & Management Strategy 18(1): 75–104.
Newey, Whitney K. and Frank Windmeijer (2009). “Generalized Method of
Moments With Many Weak Moment Conditions”. Econometrica 77(3):
687–719.
Palazzo, A. M. (2009). “Farm-level impacts of alternative spatial water man-
agement policies for the proprotect of instream flows”. MA thesis. Uni-
versity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Paly, Michael de and Andreas Zell (2009). “Optimal irrigation scheduling
with evolutionary algorithms”. Applications of Evolutionary Computing.
Springer, 142–151.
Raes, Dirk, Pasquale Steduto, Theodore C. Hsiao, and Elias Fereres (2009).
“AquaCrop-The FAO Crop Model to Simulate Yield Response to Wa-
ter: II. Main Algorithms and Software Description”. Agronomy Journal
101(3): 438–447.
Roodman, David (2009). “A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments*”.
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 71(1): 135–158.
Schlenker, Wolfram and Michael J. Roberts (2009). “Nonlinear temperature
effects indicate severe damages to U.S. crop yields under climate change”.
115
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. doi: 10.1073/pnas.
0906865106.
Steduto, Pasquale, Theodore C. Hsiao, Dirk Raes, and Elias Fereres (2009).
“AquaCrop - the FAO crop model to simulate yield response to water: I.
Concepts and underlying principles”. Agronomy Journal 101(3): 426–437.
Wriedt, Gunter, Marijn Van der Velde, Alberto Aloe, and Fayc¸al Bouraoui
(2009). “Estimating irrigation water requirements in Europe”. Journal of
hydrology 373(3): 527–544.
Araya, A., Solomon Habtu, Kiros Meles Hadgu, Afewerk Kebede, and Tad-
dese Dejene (2010). “Test of AquaCrop model in simulating biomass and
yield of water deficient and irrigated barley (Hordeum vulgare)”. Agri-
cultural Water Management 97(11): 1838–1846.
Brown, Peter D., Thomas A. Cochrane, and Thomas D. Krom (2010). “Op-
timal on-farm irrigation scheduling with a seasonal water limit using sim-
ulated annealing”. Agricultural Water Management 97(6): 892 –900.
Langpap, Christian and Jay P. Shimshack (2010). “Private citizen suits and
public enforcement: Substitutes or complements?” Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management 59(3): 235–249.
Semenov, Mikhail A and Pierre Stratonovitch (2010). “Use of multi-model
ensembles from global climate models for assessment of climate change
impacts”. Climate Research 41(1): 1–14.
Siebert, Stefan and Petra Do¨ll (2010). “Quantifying blue and green virtual
water contents in global crop production as well as potential production
losses without irrigation”. Journal of Hydrology 384(3–4): 198–217.
Steinbuks, J. and V. Foster (2010). “When do firms generate? Evidence on
in-house electricity supply in Africa”. Energy Economics 32(3): 505–514.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and
panel data. MIT press.
Anderson, T.W., Naoto Kunitomo, and Yukitoshi Matsushita (2011). “On
finite sample properties of alternative estimators of coefficients in a struc-
tural equation with many instruments”. Journal of Econometrics 165(1):
58 –69.
Cai, X., M. Hejazi, and D. Wang (2011). “Value of Probabilistic Weather
Forecasts: Assessment by Real-Time Optimization of Irrigation Schedul-
ing”. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management 137(5): 391–
403.
116
Cameron, A. Colin, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller (2011). “Robust
Inference With Multiway Clustering”. Journal of Business & Economic
Statistics 29(2): 238–249.
Chung, S-O, JA Rodr´ıguez-Dı´az, EK Weatherhead, and JW Knox (2011).
“Climate change impacts on water for irrigating paddy rice in South Ko-
rea”. Irrigation and drainage 60(2): 263–273.
Dethier, Jean-Jacques, Maximilian Hirn, and Ste´phane Straub (2011). “Ex-
plaining enterprise performance in developing countries with business cli-
mate survey data”. The World Bank Research Observer 26(2): 258–309.
Gray, Wayne B. and Jay P. Shimshack (2011). “The Effectiveness of Envi-
ronmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evi-
dence”. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy. doi: 10.1093/
reep/req017.
Scott, Christopher A (2011). “The water-energy-climate nexus: Resources
and policy outlook for aquifers in Mexico”. Water Resources Research.
doi: 10.1029/2011WR010805.
Scott, Christopher A., Suzanne A. Pierce, Martin J. Pasqualetti, Alice L.
Jones, Burrell E. Montz, and Joseph H. Hoover (2011). “Policy and in-
stitutional dimensions of the water–energy nexus”. Energy Policy 39(10):
6622–6630.
Shahid, Shamsuddin (2011). “Impact of climate change on irrigation water
demand of dry season Boro rice in northwest Bangladesh”. English. Cli-
matic Change 105(3-4): 433–453.
Stricevic, Ruzica, Marija Cosic, Nevenka Djurovic, Borivoj Pejic, and Livija
Maksimovic (2011). “Assessment of the FAO AquaCrop model in the
simulation of rainfed and supplementally irrigated maize, sugar beet and
sunflower”. Agricultural Water Management 98(10): 1615–1621.
Ferguson, Grant and Tom Gleeson (2012). “Vulnerability of coastal aquifers
to groundwater use and climate change”. Nature Climate Change 2(5):
342–345.
Garc´ıa-Vila, Margarita and El´ıas Fereres (2012). “Combining the simulation
crop model AquaCrop with an economic model for the optimization of
irrigation management at farm level”. European Journal of Agronomy
36(1): 21–31.
117
Gleeson, Tom, Yoshihide Wada, Marc FP Bierkens, and Ludovicus PH van
Beek (2012). “Water balance of global aquifers revealed by groundwater
footprint”. Nature 488(7410): 197–200.
Gondim, Rubens S, Marco AH de Castro, Aline de HN Maia, S´ılvio RM
Evangelista, and Se´rgio C de F Fuck (2012). “Climate Change Impacts on
Irrigation Water Needs in the jaguaribe River Basin1”. JAWRA Journal
of the American Water Resources Association 48(2): 355–365.
Hendricks, Nathan P. and Jeffrey Mark Peterson (2012). “Fixed Effects Es-
timation of the Intensive and Extensive Margins of Irrigation Water De-
mand”. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 37(1): 1–19.
Perveen, Shama, Chandra K. Krishnamurthy, Rajinder S. Sidhu, Kamal
Vatta, Baljinder Kaur, Vijay Modi, Lakis Fishman Ram amd Polycar-
pou, and Upmanu Lall (2012). Restoring Groundwater in Punjab, In-
dia’s Breadbasket: Finding Agricultural Solutions for Water Sustainabil-
ity. Tech. rep. Columbia Water Center.
Scanlon, Bridget R., Claudia C. Faunt, Laurent Longuevergne, Robert C.
Reedy, William M. Alley, Virginia L. McGuire, and Peter B. McMahon
(2012). “Groundwater depletion and sustainability of irrigation in the US
High Plains and Central Valley”. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1200311109.
Schaldach, Ru¨diger, Jennifer Koch, Tim Aus der Beek, Ellen Kynast, and
Martina Flo¨rke (2012). “Current and future irrigation water requirements
in pan-Europe: An integrated analysis of socio-economic and climate sce-
narios”. Global and Planetary Change. doi: 10.1016/j.gloplacha.
2012.06.004.
Wada, Yoshihide, L. P. H. van Beek, and Marc F. P. Bierkens (2012). “Non-
sustainable groundwater sustaining irrigation: A global assessment”. Wa-
ter Resources Research. doi: 10.1029/2011WR010562.
Wang, J. and S.K. Ghosh (2012). “Shape restricted nonparametric regression
with Bernstein polynomials”. Computational Statistics and Data Analysis
56(9): 2729–2741.
Biemans, H., L.H. Speelman, F. Ludwig, E.J. Moors, A.J. Wiltshire, P. Ku-
mar, D. Gerten, and P. Kabat (2013). “Future water resources for food
production in five South Asian river basins and potential for adaptation
– A modeling study”. Science of The Total Environment. doi: 10.1016/
j.scitotenv.2013.05.092.
118
Elliott, Joshua, Delphine Deryng, Christoph Mu¨ller, Katja Frieler, Markus
Konzmann, Dieter Gerten, Michael Glotter, Martina Flo¨rke, Yoshihide
Wada, Neil Best, et al. (2013). “Constraints and potentials of future irriga-
tion water availability on agricultural production under climate change”.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. doi: 10.1073/pnas.
1222474110.
Gerten, Dieter, Wolfgang Lucht, Sebastian Ostberg, Jens Heinke, Martin
Kowarsch, Holger Kreft, Zbigniew W Kundzewicz, Johann Rastgooy, Rachel
Warren, and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber (2013). “Asynchronous exposure
to global warming: freshwater resources and terrestrial ecosystems”. En-
vironmental Research Letters. doi: 10.1088/1748-9326/8/3/034032.
Haddeland, Ingjerd, Jens Heinke, Hester Biemans, Stephanie Eisner, Martina
Flo¨rke, Naota Hanasaki, Markus Konzmann, Fulco Ludwig, Yoshimitsu
Masaki, Jacob Schewe, et al. (2013). “Global water resources affected by
human interventions and climate change”. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1222475110.
Konzmann, Markus, Dieter Gerten, and Jens Heinke (2013). “Climate im-
pacts on global irrigation requirements under 19 GCMs, simulated with
a vegetation and hydrology model”. Hydrological Sciences Journal 58(1):
88–105.
Mehta, Vishal K., Van R. Haden, Brian A. Joyce, David R. Purkey, and
Louise E. Jackson (2013). “Irrigation demand and supply, given projec-
tions of climate and land-use change, in Yolo County, California”. Agricul-
tural Water Management, 70 –82. doi: 10.1016/j.agwat.2012.10.021.
Ortiz-Bobea, Ariel (2013). “Is Weather Really Additive in Agricultural Pro-
duction? Implications for Climate Change Impacts”. RFF Discussion Pa-
per, 13–41.
Scott, Christopher A (2013). “Electricity for groundwater use: constraints
and opportunities for adaptive response to climate change”. Environmen-
tal Research Letters. doi: 10.1088/1748-9326/8/3/035005.
Taylor, Richard G, Bridget Scanlon, Petra Do¨ll, Matt Rodell, Rens Van Beek,
Yoshihide Wada, Laurent Longuevergne, Marc Leblanc, James S Famigli-
etti, Mike Edmunds, et al. (2013). “Ground water and climate change”.
Nature Climate Change 3(4): 322–329.
Wada, Yoshihide, Dominik Wisser, Stephanie Eisner, Martina Flo¨rke, Dieter
Gerten, Ingjerd Haddeland, Naota Hanasaki, Yoshimitsu Masaki, Felix
119
T. Portmann, Tobias Stacke, Zachary Tessler, and Jacob Schewe (2013).
“Multimodel projections and uncertainties of irrigation water demand
under climate change”. Geophysical Research Letters 40(17): 4626–4632.
Zhang, Xiao and Ximing Cai (2013). “Climate change impacts on global agri-
cultural water deficit”. Geophysical Research Letters 40(6): 1111–1117.
Pfeiffer, Lisa and C.Y. Cynthia Lin (forthcoming). “The Effects of Energy
Prices on Groundwater Extraction in Agriculture in the High Plains
Aquifer”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics.
120
